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**AEI**

# **Patrol, Hold, Hope**

## **A Path To Restore American Military Preeminence**

**AEI Team Brief  
5 February 2014**

# BLUF: Strategic Failure Ahead

## **Global system, strategy demand global power**

- Anything less than a two-theater force does not meet strategy
- Withdrawal from Middle East unhinges US global strategy
- AEI '2-1-1' posture does not fully resource two-war capability

## **'Patrol, hold, hope' strategy**

- 'Patrol' in East Asia, Middle East
- 'Hold' with airpower in one theater while deploying from CONUS
- 'Hope' nuclear deterrence buys time for restoring conventional strength

## **Military posture: Quantity has a quality all its own**

- Full sequestration means American decline, increased global instability
- Half sequestration slows but does not halt pace of decline
- AEI 'unconstrained' option less than BCA spending levels

# PH2: A 'Tight-Rope' Strategy

## Future is now: 'We'll all be dead in 20YY'

- There can be no 'strategic pause,' systemic crisis looms
- Retaining strategic 'breadth,' rebuilding strategic 'depth'

## First steps: Reposturing the force

- Pacific presence: Sea services to the front
- Middle East: Reestablishing toeholds ashore
- Air Force is the 'swing force'
- Greater reliance on nuclear deterrence


## Move 2: Mass and modernization

- Keep what you've got: No reduction in service size
- Buy what you can: More program of record

## Long-term strategy: Prepare for preeminence

- Presence not a 'lesser included case'
- QDR focus should be on winning wars, not fighting battles


# 'Pivot:' Patrol the Front, Defend in Depth



# Pivot: No Quiet on the Pacific Front

— PRC ADIZ expansion


Skirmish Density Scale\*



Low


High

\*Measures incidence of skirmishes  
within 100 km range



Recent PRC ADIZ  
declaration covers  
area with high  
density of past  
flashpoints

# Pivot: No Quiet on the Pacific Front



Significant increase of flashpoint incident frequency since 2010

# Demands of 'Pivot' Posture

## Forward basing: Disperse, harden, increase

- **NEA:** Improve ability to host tankers; create 'FARP teams' for F-35B, Ryukyus
- **SEA:** Airfields for P-8s, UAVs; Philippines: 'LCS group;' port, airfield upgrades
- **Taiwan:** Prepare for 'road-mobile' operations
- **Building Depth:** Northern Australia: 'Second Guam'

## Forces: Increased operational agility

- **Navy:** 1.5 CVGB, add F-35B to air wing, double sub capacity, increase complement and diversify mix of surface combatants
- **Marine:** 1.5 ARG (America class), accelerate F-35B, disperse through Ryukyus
- **Air Force:** Add F-35Bs, create 'FARP' capacity, develop 6<sup>th</sup> gen air superiority fighter
- **Army:** Retain Korea garrison, add SRBM/IRBM in Ryukyus
- **Building partnerships:** Develop and exercise C2, build regional ASW architecture, proliferate F-35B, maritime surveillance and patrol capabilities (UAVs, P-3/8, small craft, LCS, new 'coalition' frigate)

# 'Re-Pivot': No Quiet on the 'GME' Front



**West Africa Theater:**  
AQ affiliates threaten  
'Med moderates,'  
weak WA states


**Syria-Iraq Theater:**  
Central front in  
Shi'a/Iran-Sunni/Saudi  
regional war

**South Asia Theater:**  
'AfPak' AQ heartland

**HOA Theater:**  
AQ affiliates threaten  
Arabian peninsula, East  
African states; source of  
direct threat to US



# 'Re-Pivot': Reinventing US Posture



# Demands of 'Re-Pivot' Posture

## Forward Basing: 'Platforms' for Force Projection

- **AfPak**: 25,000 strength, CT embedded in train & assist force, platform for 'reception and onward movement' of follow-on forces
- **Persian Gulf**: Retain current naval posture, bolster land-based air
- **Jordan**: 'Second Kuwait;' 5,000-7,500 strength; power projection platform
- **Horn of Africa**: Upgrade JTF-HOA for FID missions
- **West Africa**: Create 'JTF-WA' for regional CT, partner-building

## Forces: Retain CT/COIN presence, add combat power

- **Navy**: 1 CVGB with F-35C, accompanying surface combatants, 'LCS group' for Gulf of Guinea
- **Marine**: 1 ARG rotation: West Africa-Med-Red Sea-HOA
- **Air Force**: Add 2 composite wings in Jordan, Saudi Arabia
- **Army**: HQ plus 3 brigades in AfPak, HQ plus 1 BCT in Jordan, HQ plus JTF in WA
- **Building partnerships**: broaden CT/COIN coalitions, rebuild Gulf-centered 'Moderate Sunni-Israel' coalition

# Danger: AEI Unconstrained!

## Force development: Keep mass, accelerate modernization

- **Personnel:** Retain current force size, marginal civilian reduction
- **Modernization:** Buy stealthy fighters (esp. F-35B), tankers, bombers, subs, surface combatants
- **Basing and access:** Maximize in both Pacific and Greater Middle East
- **Readiness:** Accept partial tiered readiness, improve sustainment
- **Long-term investments:** Unmanned systems, space, comms, logistics

## Defense budgets: Points of reference

- **Versus BCA:** Our 'unconstrained' less than pre-BCA levels
- **Versus GDP:** Our 'unconstrained' fails to reach '4 percent for freedom'
- **Versus sequestration:** \$780B shortfall

## Final thoughts: Strategic risk reduced, not eliminated

- **Presence risk:** Lowered; now 'acceptable'
- **Crisis/initial conflict risk:** Lowered; now 'manageable'
- **War-winning risks:** Remain significant; 'long war' and 'second war' issues