A Rebalanced Force for Assured Access

CSBA

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

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• Preventing the domination of key overseas regions by hostile powers while maintaining access to and from those areas remain vital US interests.

• A range of challenges – WMD, A2/AD, irregular/hybrid, and cyber threats – have the potential to shift regional security balances and erode the effectiveness of traditional forms of US military power projection.

• CSBA’s strategic approach intended to shore up US security commitments and regional security balances, while deterring regional hegemonic aspirants:
  – Emphasizes projecting power despite WMD or A2/AD threats while maintaining robust strategic deterrence and counterterrorism forces.
  – Places premium on capabilities and forces best able to operate in non-permissive environments overseas (access-insensitive, low-signature, highly distributed).
  – Seeks optimal balance between combat strike power, range, survivability, and sustainability.
• To ensure **strategy-driven approach**, maximized resource allocation to highest priority capabilities and forces before making cuts to lowest priority areas

• Traded current **capacities** for advanced **capabilities** best aligned with strategic approach to improve longer-term readiness (gave priority to force shaping over force sizing)

• Sought to protect near-term **readiness**, but could not do so at full BCA-level cuts

**Full BCA:** Rebalanced capabilities first, then focused on budget target

• Traded personnel, force structure and some readiness in first FYDP to modernize for future challenges

**Half BCA:** Accelerated and expanded capabilities rebalancing

• Bought back 100% readiness for both FYDPs

**Prioritized New “Crown Jewels”**

• Cyber and electronic warfare
• Expanded undersea capacity
• Advanced unmanned, long-range penetrating air ISR & strike
• Protected space systems & post-GPS navigation
• Special Operations Forces
• Nuclear forces
• Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range, multi-mission air systems
• Increased carrier air wing range and persistence
• Bought next generation precision munitions

• Added undersea capacity for standoff strikes
• Increased subs and UUVs, combat logistics ships, and MCM ships
• Developed DE and railguns as force multipliers
- Reduced armor forces
- New long-range, land-based strike capabilities
- Sustained expeditionary forces for crisis response

- Increased funding for SOF persistent engagement
- Invested in capabilities for ops in denied environments: clandestine insertion and extraction, comms, identity masking
• Increased cyber warfare capabilities
• Protected SATCOM, space situational awareness
• Post-GPS precision navigation

• Increased resiliency of Pacific basing posture
• Developed “at-sea” VLS reloading
• Initiated BRAC for CONUS

• Maintained nuclear triad
• Funded strategic modernization programs
- Traded military end strength, civilian personnel, and contract support for robust future capabilities
- Reduced near-term readiness (1st FYDP) to support modernization
  - Fully restored readiness in 2nd FYDP
• Enhanced Pacific posture with additional dispersal locations, hardening, and rapid repair capabilities
  - Doubled investment compared to Full BCA

• Funded 100% readiness and full S&T investments over both FYDPs

• Prioritized developing the right capabilities mix over buying back more end strength
• Although further budget cuts are undesirable, may provide forcing function for needed rebalancing across military to meet future challenges

• At full BCA level cuts, however, significant reduction in readiness would be unavoidable

• Shift from full BCA to half BCA allowed team to fully protect readiness and shift faster toward development and fielding of key capabilities
  
  — Conscious decision under “Half BCA” scenario NOT to use relief to buy-back force structure and personnel

• **CAVEAT:** Exercise scenario represents the “best case” because teams had total flexibility to reallocate resources
  
  — Without such flexibility to address compensation, infrastructure and end-strength, cuts of these magnitudes will almost certainly result in far less capable future Joint Force