Strategy is about how to array limited resources in space and time to achieve your aims against a competitor.

- In *short wars*, you fight with your existing military
- In *protracted wars*, the material dimension becomes more important
- In *long-term peacetime competitions*, the economic dimension is even more important
Competitive strategies follow the logic of strategy, but in peacetime:

- Competitive strategies seek limited aims. They are meant to change a competitor’s decision-making calculus.

- Competitive strategies can, and often do, involve the use of military assets, but focus on the latent use of force to coerce or deter.
  - A key consideration is what to conceal and when vs. what to show and when.

- Competitive strategies contend with a greater degree of uncertainty than wartime strategy.

- Tolerance for risk is generally lower in peace than in war.

- It takes longer to determine the effects of strategy in peace than in war.
Families of Peacetime Strategy

- Denial
- Cost imposition
- Attacking the opponent’s strategy
- Attacking the opponent’s decision making
Considerations

• A Concrete and Sophisticated Opponent.

• Sufficient Understanding of the Competitor to Formulate, Implement Strategies.

• Recognition that Each Side’s Choices are Constrained.

• Should Account for Time, and Make it a Virtue.

• Should Account for Interaction over Time.
Measures of Effectiveness

• Options:
  – Increased Set of U.S. Options
  – Constrained Set of Competitor Options

• Cost Imposition:
  – Averting Costs from Being Imposed on the U.S.
  – Imposing Costs on Competitors

• Initiative:
  – Who is Reacting to Whom?
  – Who Controls the Pace and Scope of the Competition?
THE GATHERING PACIFIC STORM

Emerging U.S.-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development

edited by TAI MING CHEUNG and THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

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The Gathering Pacific Storm

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China’s focus remains on near-seas, where U.S. has geographic advantage
PLAN designed to support sea control rather than power projection
PLAN surface fleet focused on defensive missions

USN Surface Combatants
- CG
- DDG-51 Flight I
- DDG-51 Flight II
- DDG-51 Flight III
- DDG-51 Flight IV
- DDG-1000
- LCS-1
- LCS-2
- MCM (FDNF counted, 13 total)
- PC (Not counted in Battle Force)
- FF

PLA(N) Surface Combatants
- Sovremmeny
- Luhu (Type 052)
- Luyang III (Type 052D)
- Luyang I (Type 052B)
- Luyang II (Type 052C)
- Luyang I (Type 052B)
- Jiangwei I (Type 053H2G)
- Jiangwei II (Type 053H3)
- Jiangkai I (Type 054)
- Jiangkai II (Type 054A)
- Houbei (Type 022)
- Jiangdao (Type 056)
Significant asymmetry in VLS capacity reflects Chinese strategy

**USN Surface-to-Surface Missile Capacity**

**PLAN Surface-to-Surface Missile Capacity**

Plan can only devote VLS cells to offensive weapons by relying on land-based defenses in near-seas
PLAN deployed presence (2018)

PLAN expanding overseas presence, but remains focused on WESTPAC

Total: ~320 Ships
Deployed: 37 Ships

~3 ships (Europe)
1 DDG
1 FFG
1 Auxiliary

~3 ships (Africa)
1 FFG
1 AH
1 Auxiliary

~5 ships (GoA/IO)
1 DDG
1 FFG
1 LPD
1 Auxiliary
1 SS

~40 ships Local Ops
1 CV
2 DDG
2 FFG
4 FFL
1 Auxiliary
1 SSN
3 SS

~12 ships (WESTPAC)
2 DDG
2 FFG
3 FFL
1 Auxiliary
1 SSN
3 SS

~14 ships (SCS)
1 CV
2 DDG
2 FFG
4 FFL
1 Auxiliary
1 LPD
3 SS

Total: 289 Ships
Deployed: 91 Ships

~15 ships
3 DDG
2 CG/DDG
2 SSN
4 CLF
2 Amphibs
2 LCC/Support

~17 ships
5 CG/DDG
1 SSN
1 SSGN
3 Amphibs
2 CLF
1 ESB
1 ESD
3 Support

~58 ships
1 CVN
9 CG/DDG
4 CG/DDG
4 MCM
3 SSN
4 SSN
1 SSGN
4 Amphib
2 Amphib
10 CLF
16 LCC/Support

~45 ships
3 DDG
2 CG/DDG
2 SSN
4 CLF
2 Amphibs
2 LCC/Support

Local Ops

Total: 289 Ships
Deployed: 91 Ships
U.S. should stress near-seas, while exploiting advantages in far seas

• **Observations**
  – Enduring Chinese disadvantages likely to be geopolitical rather than technical in nature
  – China’s focus is still largely on near seas and asymmetric capabilities to blunt U.S. force projection
  – The U.S. cannot cede near seas to Chinese control without risking alliances
  – U.S. already has a significant capability to contest far seas, which China is not developing a force to effectively counter.

• **Implications**
  – Implies that whole-of government U.S. strategies are crucial; strictly technical policies may not fully exploit China’s areas of weakness
  – U.S. strategies to sustain access in contested areas should seek to defeat Chinese long-range missiles and sensors – compelling China to pursue more symmetric approaches

• **In a long-term competition, China might double down on asymmetric, near seas investments**
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