


### Winning the Airwaves

Regaining America's Advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

#### EMS warfare defined




- All military operations in EMS are elements of EMS warfare
- Not broken up into communications, sensing, and electronic warfare
- EMS a domain analogous to air, sea, and undersea

#### Hypothesis

- Warfare areas evolve as long-term competitions
- Each moves through phases or "competitive regimes"
  - Driven by predominant operational concepts and technology
- Shifts in competitive regimes are coming
  - EMS warfare, undersea warfare, air warfare, strike, etc.
- The U.S. can advantageously position itself for next phase
  - This should be the focus of "offset" strategies


### CSBA Long-term EMS warfare competition

- WW I to mid-WW II: active comms/sensing vs. passive counters
- Mid-WW II through Cold War: active systems vs. active counters
- Late Cold War: a shift toward stealth, LPI/LPD, and passive
- Next phase: low power / passive sensors, comms, and counters




EMS warfare drives the "hider-finder" competition

### CSBA Phase 1: active networks vs. passive counters




#### CSBA Phase 2: active networks v. active counters




Smaller, more powerful radars & jammers and speed of conflict made jamming of sensors/comms more advantageous

### CSBA Active vs. active CONOPs grew unsustainable



"Virtual attrition" of strike power demanded a new approach

#### CSBA Phase 3: Passive/LPD networks & counters






DARPA Have Blue demo led to F-117 and showed ability to reduce RF signature in some frequencies and aspects

B-2 bomber built on Have Blue and F-117 to provide all-aspect stealth across wider frequency range

LO aircraft with LPI/LPD sensors and comms, and lower-power jamming reduce "overhead" for air defense suppression

#### CSBA Shift to Phase 3 truncated w/ Cold War's end





- U.S. partially adopted low-to-no power EMS warfare
- Today's force is a hybrid of stealth, LPI, LPD and active vs. active
- Will competition restart with today's emerging threats?

## CSBA Today's hybrid force is falling behind

#### Adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) improving

- In capability & scope, including new players such as Iran and Syria
- U.S. forces will operate at increasing range from enemy
- Active sensors and countermeasures must operate at higher powers

#### Adversaries have home field; can adopt new approaches first

- Enemy can use larger, networked sensor arrays in A2/AD complex
- Can operate at lower frequency, passive, and multi-static
- Defender more likely to detect U.S. high-power active forces first

#### U.S. EM capabilities are static and occupy defined frequencies

- Adversaries targeting them as part of A2/AD with jammers and ECM
- Enemy sensors and comms able to avoid U.S. countermeasures

### CSBA New EMS warfare operational concepts

- Need to move away from high-power active approaches
  - Unless they are carefully controlled to be LPI/LPD
- "Low-to-no power" detection ("finder")
  - Use of low-power "probes" to stimulate enemy emissions
  - Multi-static sensors using friendly or enemy emitters
  - Passive geolocation of emitters in IR/RF
  - LIDAR and highly directional low-power RF sensors
  - Passive coherent detection using reflected ambient EM energy
- "Low-to-no power" counter-detection ("hider")
  - Stand-in jamming of enemy's active sensors and weapons
  - Reduction of EO/IR/RF signatures (i.e., expanded stealth tech)
  - Low-power decoy and deception


#### Passive and multi-static detection



## CSBA Detection with reflected ambient noise




## CSBA Protecting forces vs. anti-access threats




## What the enemy sees



## Conducting strike operations



### Conducting assault operations



## CSBA Priorities for EMS warfare technologies

Networked


Agile and maneuverable

Multifunction


Small and less expensive

Adaptable

## CSBA Networking essential to new concepts




## CSBA Agility to evade threats, exploit openings



Maneuver in frequency, power, time, beam direction, & beam shape to protect friendly EMS operations while denying those of enemy

## CSBA Multifunction arrays improve efficiency



Each platform and payload must participate in EMS warfare network; multifunction arrays reduce the number of separate systems needed

## CSBA Smaller, cheaper EMS systems needed






#### New concepts:

- Use more expendable EMS warfare payloads
- Incorporate almost every manned or unmanned platform
- Employ multiple RF and EO/IR arrays per platform

EMS emitter/receivers need to become commoditized to enable every platform and payload to participate in network

## CSBA Moving from automation to adaptation



Today's systems react to recognized situations w/ pre-planned responses; future systems must assess EMS and develop & refine COAs to best exploit it



#### Impediments to progress

- Lack of new operating concepts
  - Needed to drive requirements & acquisition structure

- Acquisition process and organization
  - Focused on programs, vice capabilities

- Funding aligned to R&D, not acquisition
  - Only S&T orgs and labs can look holistically

### CSBA Today's CONOPs constrain innovation

#### Don't exploit new tech


- Networked emitters/receivers
- Adaptive EMS systems
- Agile EO/IR/RF operations
- Multifunction arrays & controllers


#### Remain system v. system

- Pre-planned techniques
- Library of threats and responses


#### Keep "high-power" approach

- Unsustainable vs. A2/AD threat
- Delay requirements changes





### CSBA Acquisition stove-piped & slow to act



#### Dependent on requirements

- DoD generates new documents for each program
- Limited options to shorten requirements process

#### Organized by hardware

 PMs for individual missions (radio, EW, RWR, radar, SIGINT)

#### No incentives for cooperation

- Multifunction EM systems cross multiple PMs and PEOs
- Increases programmatic risk

### CSBA New tech maturing, not being fielded

#### RDTE funding rising


- Technology rapidly maturing
- Or transitioning w/out requirements


#### Procurement falling

- Completion of E/A-18G
- Will rise with NGJ, SEWIP
- No programs for new approaches

#### EW EXCOM focused on PB

- Not yet exploring new EW or EMS warfare approach
- Should be driving new approaches and tech transition





#### Recommendations

- EW EXCOMM establish "pull" for new EM technologies
  - Set priorities for implementing low to no power EMS warfare
- Services develop new EMS warfare operational concepts
  - And establish requirements for low to no power capabilities
- Services / CCDRs expand EMS warfare demonstrations
  - In near-term to field new capabilities & inform requirements
- Congress and DoD refine acquisition process
  - Reduce new requirements analysis for payloads (vs. platforms)
- Services promote integration between EMS warfare PMs
  - Through capability area PMs & incentivizing integration

## **Questions**