Joint Think Tank Exercise: Alternative Defense Strategies
Each team was asked to:

- Develop its own alternative defense strategy and rebalance DoD’s major capabilities in light of projected security challenges
- Use CSBA’s tool to rebalance over the next two FYDPs (FY18-22 and FY23-27) in an unconstrained financial environment
  - Teams recognized that defense resourcing is not truly unconstrained
  - Exercise sought to explore strategies independent of arbitrary BCA caps
- Brief their strategy, rationale, major capability tradeoffs, and associated impacts (near-term, far-term)

*The strategies devised and the choices implemented by each team reflect their personal views and not institutional perspectives*

Team’s developed rough resourcing and force structure requirements necessary to implement their strategy
Develop an alternative defense strategy in light of future challenges

- Base strategy on team assessment of the future operating environment and identification of key security challenges or threats
- Prioritize mission areas for the future force
- Identify key capability shortfalls and opportunities for investment or divestment

Create a rebalancing strategy to support your priorities

- How should DoD be prepared to operate over the next ten years and beyond?
- What are the overarching operational concepts for each Service that should drive their capability investments?
- What capabilities mix will be needed in 10 years to support these concepts?
• Options are organized by major capability areas (not Services)
• Clicking on a option opens a popup box with additional details
• Costs automatically update when an option is selected
• A running total of actual savings compared to target savings is displayed at the top
• Running total of force structure impacts is also displayed
Team Rebalancing Strategies and Choices
CSBA Strategic Choices
2016

October 18, 2016

Thomas Donnelly
Co-Director, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies
American Enterprise Institute

Contributors:
Phillip Lohaus, Research Fellow
Rick Berger, Research Associate
James Cunningham, Senior Research Associate
Alex El-Fakir, Public Interest Fellow
US Defense Strategy
Three Geopolitical Imperatives

1. Necessity for immediate action
2. Global view of security interests
3. Create 21st-century international order
Three-Theater Force Sizing Construct

Deter Russian and Chinese aggression and roll back adversaries in the Middle East through:

- Forward-based forces
- Strategic reserve of active-duty and reserve forces
- Mobilization base capable of sustaining wars if needed

US is a global superpower. It should not “pivot.”
Three-Theater Construct: Europe

ACRs, stealthy fighters, and naval presence in Three Seas:

- Heavy ACR in Poland, medium in Baltics, and light in southeast Europe
  - Organic artillery/aviation battalions attached & tailored infantry/armor
- Combat aviation brigade & armored BCT in Germany, add new artillery brigade, cargo support aviation brigade, retain 173rd for AFRICOM missions
- Two blended F-22/F-35 wings
- Expanded logistics and forward basing in Central and Eastern Europe
- Secure the Three Seas: Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea
Three-Theater Construct: East Asia

Two CSGs, two ARGs, and fifth-gen fighters:

- Forward-station two Carrier Strike Groups and two ARGs
  - Large F-35B fleet
  - Moving toward increased ARG presence in 2\textsuperscript{nd} FYDP

- Two blended F-22/F-35 wings

- Forward-base 4 more SSNs, 2 more destroyers, new tenders

- Expand small surface combatant fleet & add new cruiser
Three-Theater Construct: Middle East

Ground-based aircraft, better ISR, carrier presence:
- Blended wing of F-22/F-35 fighters
- Permanent Carrier Strike Group, but less emphasis on strike
- Strong US & partner ISR capabilities
- Shift from raiding to campaigning — supplement SOF & strikes with enduring land-based presence
  - “Americans in, Russians out, Iranians down“
Three-Theater Construct:
Operational & Strategic Reserve

Build capacity to win large, long, high-end conflicts:

- Larger Army and Marine Corps
- Modernization of bombers and nuclear and space assets
- Expanded strategic airlift
- Readiness buyback & sustained investment
Major Capabilities
Key Priorities of the Rebuild

Expand, invest, and forward base now:

- Expand force structure and invest in readiness
  - For day-to-day requirements and to build strategic reserve
- Procure mature capabilities rapidly
  - For high-end fights and to begin undoing procurement holiday
- Increase forward-based troops
  - Assure allies, deter adversaries, & defeat declared enemies
Modernization Highlights

1. Stealth *en masse*: F-35, F-22, B-21

2. Protected, swarming power projection
   i. Redesigned *Zumwalt*
   ii. Carriers and amphibs with F-35B

3. Subsurface dominance: *Virginia*-class and SOSUS

4. Ground-gaining forces:
   i. Restart Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
   ii. More and longer-range artillery
Budget Projections
Where the Money’s Going

AEI 2016 Summary of Adds / Cuts
Total Defense Spending: AEI’s Plan vs. Obama’s Budget

$1302.2B Total Increase

Move 1 Move 2 Total

Billions of USD (nominal)

AEI PB17

$470.3B $831.9B $1302.2B

Increase in Move 1 Increase in Move 2 Total

$3,484 $4,138 $7,622

$3,014 $3,306 $6,320

$1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 $8,000
BUDGETARY SAVINGS UNDER A STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT
Developing Alternative Defense Strategies, 2016

Group Members
Benjamin Friedman, Cato Institute
Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
Trevor Thrall, Cato Institute

with help from
Eugene Gholz, Gordon Adams, William Ruger,
Matthew Fay, Laicie Heeley, Wendy Jordan
# Savings under Restraint

Total savings over the next 10 years: $1+ Trillion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected Cost: $2.98 Trillion</td>
<td>Projected Cost: $2.64 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Savings: $345.3 Billion</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FYDP 2023-2027</th>
<th>FYDP 2023-2027 under Restraint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projected Cost: $3.31 Trillion</td>
<td>Projected Cost: $2.58 Trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Savings: $724.3 Billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Ready, Modern Force

READY FOR TODAY, PREPARED FOR TOMORROW

Jerry Hendrix, Paul Scharre, and Elbridge Colby
The Center for a New American Security does not take institutional positions on policy issues.

Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this brief should be understood to be solely those of Jerry Hendrix, Paul Scharre, and Elbridge Colby.
A Balanced Strategy

Maintain readiness for today’s threats.

Modernize the force for emerging challenges.
Economically-Affordable Sustainment of U.S. Global Leadership

• 
  Defend the homeland against terrorist, missile, and cyber attacks.

• Maintain a force sized sufficiently to provide a stabilizing presence abroad.

• Project power into anti-access areas, including Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific.

• Sustain and modernize our nuclear deterrent.

• Deter and defeat regional aggression by Iran, N. Korea, and non-state actors.
A Ready, Modern, Balanced Force

- Restore **readiness** (flying hours, depot maintenance).
- Invest in **emerging technologies** (cyber, robotics, directed energy, human performance, etc.).
- Field a diverse **high-low mix** of forces to cover the full range of missions most effectively and efficiently.
Predictable But Restrained Budget

$ Do it all within a 2% increase in defense spending over PB17 levels.
Budget Top-Line in Perspective

DOD Discretionary Budget Authority
(FY17 dollars in billions)
U.S. Navy

- **Grew the fleet by 27%** – from 272 ships to 345 – in 10 years.

- Increased **undersea strike capacity** – increased from 58 to 74 submarines, adding 680 cruise missile tubes.

- Invested in **new technologies** – unmanned systems, directed energy, electromagnetic rail gun, & high velocity projectile.

- Invested in lower-cost commercial derivative ships (black hulls) as expeditionary sea bases to expand overall **expeditionary lift capacity**.

- Reduced legacy high-cost, low-value assets for A2/AD environments – **terminated Ford- and America-class carrier production lines** and curtailed LPD/LSD fleet.
U.S. Air Force

• Increased:
  – Overall Air Force TACAIR inventory by +180 aircraft by using a high-low mix.
  – **Stealthy bombers by +44%** with an increased B-21 buy.
  – Developed new **stealthy uninhabited combat aircraft** (UCAV).
  – Additional KC-130J tankers for **distributed operations** inside A2/AD areas.

• Procured **advanced munitions** (JASSM-ER, SDB II, LRASM, MALD-J, new long-range air-to-air missile, collaborative munitions, upgraded PNT).

• Invested in **new technologies** – high-energy lasers, high-powered microwave weapons (CHAMP), and distributed aerial swarms (Gremlins).

• Preserved airlift and non-stealthy unmanned ISR.

• Funded investments by:
  – Reducing non-stealthy bombers (retired 60 B-1 bombers).
  – Trimming F-35A quantities by 60 aircraft over 10 years.
U.S. Army and Marine Corps

- Preserved active-duty Army end-strength at ~\textbf{450,000}.
- Rebalanced from light infantry to \textbf{armor, precision fires, missile defense,} and \textbf{electronic warfare}.
- Increased \textbf{active-duty armor BCTs} from 9 to 12.
- Invested in \textbf{robotic logistics} (ground and air) to save costs.
- Cut \textbf{5 active-duty USMC battalions} to reflect decreased amphibious lift capacity.
- Cut U.S. Army Reserves by \textbf{11\%} and USMC by \textbf{5\%}.
- Preserved \textbf{regeneration capacity} in Advise and Assist Brigades.
Strategic Systems

- Modernized the **nuclear triad** and invested in enhanced C2.
- Increased **space resiliency** and airborne layer C2 & PNT.
- Increased strategic **cyber offense & defense**.
- Increased **missile defense**:
  - Additional THAAD (+2) and Patriot (+2) batteries.
  - +40 additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs).
  - Game-changing technologies: electromagnetic rail gun and high velocity projectiles (HVP).
Combat-Credible Forward Presence

- +2 Armored BCTs
- +1 Stryker BCT
- +1 Combat Aviation Brigade

+2 Carriers
+ Attack Submarines
+ Destroyers
Base Resiliency and Access

• Increased capabilities for airfield dispersal, rapid runway repair, and at-sea VLS rearming.

• Invested $2B on improving partner bases for U.S. access and logistics.

• Added SOF regional hubs for rapid access in high-threat regions.
Restored Readiness

- **Restored readiness** damaged by BCA cuts by increasing funding above PB17 levels for:
  - Flying hours
  - Depot maintenance
Increased R&D

• Increased R&D spending by $24 billion over 10 years to capitalize on emerging technologies:
  – Advanced weapons: railgun, hypersonics, high-energy lasers
  – Electronic warfare, cyber, networking, PNT
  – Advanced undersea and aerospace technologies
  – Artificial intelligence and human performance

• Increased DARPA agency funding.
Building Partner Capacity

- Invested in capabilities to build partner capacity:
  - Expanded security force assistance training.
  - Created 2 Advise and Assist Brigades (3000 personnel).
  - Created a light attack squadron to train partners in low-end air capabilities.
  - Increased SOF language training.
Management Efficiencies

• Saved **$55B over 10 years** by cutting 5% of DOD civilian workforce and 8,000 contractors.

• Cuts made possible by HQ de-layering, automation of jobs, and process efficiencies.

• Trimmed additional **$27B over 10 years** by initiating BRAC, eliminating commissary subsidies, and raising TRICARE fees.
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Maintaining Our Military’s Competitive Advantages

Mark Gunzinger, Jacob Cohn, Timothy Walton, Ryan Boone

18 October 2016
The United States will organize, train, and equip a military capable of:

- Defending the United States and its interests
- Defeating enemies attempting to coerce or compel U.S. allies and partners
- Deterring, denying, or, if necessary, preventing adversaries from constraining access to the global commons
- Providing assistance to allies and partners to improve their security capacity against a range of threats

Russia and China both pose great-power challenges

- Whereas Russia poses the greater immediate threat, China poses the greater long-term challenge
- Current U.S. capabilities and posture are insufficient to counter Russian or Chinese aggression

DoD must maintain a balance between current readiness and modernization – however, it can no longer tradeoff one for the other
Regional priorities

• Increase resources to meet commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, reassure U.S. allies and partners, deter and/or prevent an increasingly assertive China from successfully conducting acts of aggression

• Recommit to Europe to support NATO partners against both traditional Russian military threats as well as evolving A2/AD and subconventional challenges

• Continue to deter North Korea and Iran from conducting missile attacks (possibly with WMD), subconventional aggression, or other hostile acts

• Sustain operations to combat terrorist organizations across the Middle East and other geographic regions
Access to modern technologies are lowering the bar for enemies to field asymmetric capabilities
   - Precision guidance, robotics, autonomy, cyber/EM spectrum, directed energy, advanced computing, etc.

A2/AD complexes increase risks to forces operating from forward bases, in littoral regions, or tied to complex logistics chains

Enemy precision-guided capabilities are eroding the U.S. military’s strike advantage while posing a greater threat to U.S. allies and partners

Growing cost-exchange imbalances as well as increasing U.S. personnel and O&M costs are undermining the U.S. military’s ability to conduct operations as it has in the past

The U.S. military must change how it plans to operate in the future – its operational concepts – as well as its capabilities
Competition in all domains (air, sea, space, cyberspace/EM spectrum) are driven by predominant operational concepts and technologies.

We are entering new phases in a number of competitions enabled by advances in computing power, commercial innovation, and proliferation of technology across borders.

The U.S. can gain advantage by shifting early to the next phase of key competitions.

- Identify where new competitive regimes align with American strengths, invest to solidify advantages.
- Shifting to the next phase can create more enduring advantages than continuing incremental (and increasingly expensive) improvements.
- This should be a key focus of “offset” strategies.
## Competitive shifts and implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shift From</th>
<th>Shift Toward</th>
<th>Illustrative Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deterrence</strong></td>
<td>Preparing for “decisive” defeats in short-duration, conventional major theater wars</td>
<td>Countering gray zone aggression; preparing for denial &amp; punishment ops, and protracted conflicts</td>
<td>Survivable forward presence backed by rapid response global strike forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Precision Strike</strong></td>
<td>Overwhelming strike advantage (precision replaces mass)</td>
<td>Strike parity, salvo competitions (precision + mass needed)</td>
<td>Survivable platforms launching short-range (70-400 nm) standoff strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air-to-Air Warfare</strong></td>
<td>Short-range sensors and weapons, maneuvering engagements</td>
<td>Networked sensors; BVR missile engagements</td>
<td>Stealthy, long-range, networked manned + unmanned aircraft with larger payloads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air &amp; Missile Defense</strong></td>
<td>Active, kinetic, layered defenses prioritizing long-range intercepts; bias toward BMD</td>
<td>Shoot the archers; higher capacity, medium-range kinetic &amp; non-kinetic salvo defenses; base resiliency</td>
<td>Distributed ops; lower-cost SAMs; DE including EW; gun-launched guided projectiles; dispersal; CCD; hardening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Surface Warfare</strong></td>
<td>“Full scope” power projection; all conflict phases; fleet defense</td>
<td>Sea/air denial operations; episodic power projection; more offensive capacity/distributed lethality</td>
<td>Multi-mission weapons; medium-range interceptors + non-kinetic defenses free VLS capacity for offensive weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undersea Warfare</strong></td>
<td>Maritime; manned submarine-centric; passive acoustic</td>
<td>Cross-domain operations; networked, low-frequency acoustic array and non-acoustic systems</td>
<td>Unmanned underwater vehicles and mission modules; fixed/expeditionary infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic Choices

Vietnam, 1970
- 30 fighter sorties
- 176 unguided bombs (88,000 lbs)
- 1 target

Iraq, 1991
- 1 fighter sortie
- 2 laser-guided bombs (4,000 lbs)
- 1 or 2 targets

Iraq, 2003
- 1 bomber sortie
- 16 PGMs (32,000 lbs)
- Up to 16 targets

Emerging Reality
- Enemy precision defenses against PGMs, including kinetic and directed energy weapons
- Passive defenses (hardening, deception, other) reduce probability of striking actual targets
- Enemies capable of degrading C4ISR networks supporting U.S. precision strike operations

Opportunities for DoD
- Improve salvo survivability: stealth, hypersonic, decoys, jamming, collaborative weapons
- Increase targets per sortie: miniaturized PGMs, brilliant submunitions, high-power RF warheads, lethality enhancements
- Modular and multi-mission PGMs to improve mission flexibility and capacity of strike platforms
## Competitive shifts and implications (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shift From</th>
<th>Shift Toward</th>
<th>Illustrative Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carrier Aviation</strong></td>
<td>Persistent carrier operations in range to strike inland targets</td>
<td>CVNs support sustained ISR &amp; strike ops from greater standoff distances</td>
<td>Refuelable, broadband/all-aspect LO UCAS with significant payloads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Warfare</strong></td>
<td>Combined arms maneuver warfare; counterinsurgency ops; assume local air superiority</td>
<td>Multi-domain operations in A2/AD; unconventional warfare; operations to counter gray zone aggression</td>
<td>Long-range, networked precision fires; air and missile defense; coastal sea denial operations; networked EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EM Spectrum Warfare</strong></td>
<td>High-power RF, large-bandwidth C2, space-based ISR and communications</td>
<td>Passive to low-power EMS operations including communications; improved signature reduction</td>
<td>Distributed, networked EMS operations; signature management; multi-functional capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious Warfare</strong></td>
<td>Large-scale assaults; establish lodgments for joint forces</td>
<td>Distributed, small-scale, littoral raids with limited objectives</td>
<td>Numerous ship-to-shore connectors; adaptable forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistics</strong></td>
<td>Lean, “just in time” delivery; specialized military requirements; hub-and-spoke</td>
<td>Robust, commercial-military hybrid requirements and delivery; distributed nodes</td>
<td>Less forward logistics support; graceful attrition; autonomous &amp; predictive logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Space</strong></td>
<td>Large, dedicated satellites for PNT, communications, and ISR</td>
<td>Fractionated/distributed; hosted payloads; increased space resiliency</td>
<td>Rapid replenishment/survivability; commercial comms; airborne layers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Deterrence</strong></td>
<td>Decreasing focus; wide area, strategic; counter-proliferation</td>
<td>Tailored, usable effects; counter-employment; survivable launch</td>
<td>Electronics hardening; survivable penetrators; more escalation options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **Late Cold War:** U.S. began shifting towards stealth and low-probability of intercept/detection (LPI/LPD) communications and sensing

• **Today:** Shift to the next phase – “low to no power” sensors, communications, adaptive, networked EW – to keep ahead of innovative threats
  – Real-time analysis of EM environment, ability to adapt to avoid interference and improve countermeasures
  – Systems utilize greater portions of frequency spectrum, “frequency hop” to avoid detection and countermeasures
  – Smaller, multi-function (communications, EW, sensing) systems on nearly all platforms operating in contested areas
  – Networked passive sensors opportunistically use ambient EM energy to locate threats and avoid detection
  – Low-power sensors and jammers on networked unmanned systems and expendable weapons
  – Open architecture systems for faster tech refresh
Strategic choices: Army

### Trends

- Pace of conflict, contested theater access drive requirements to posture additional logistics-intensive forces and materials forward
- Ground forces should be capable of operating in contested operational areas with reduced support from air forces
- Precision strike technologies offer new offensive and defensive options for highly mobile ground forces, particularly in air-denied areas
- Persistent demand for Army forces to counter gray zone aggression and conduct train, advise, and assist operations in multiple geographic regions

### Investment decisions

- Major expansion of ground-based, long-range precision fires and EW
- Lower-cost, higher-capacity air and missile defenses (e.g., HPM, EW, IFPC, lasers) plus increased current interceptors
- Forward base ABCTs, CABs, HIMARS, AMD batteries in Europe and Pacific to enhance deterrence and improve responsiveness; expand PREPO (especially for precision fires and AMD) to improve crisis response
- Expanded SOF and train, advise, and assist force to address likely challenges while preventing readiness loss in other areas

### Investment Highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Highlight</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fielded new HIMARS/FFL battalions</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed/procured long-range ground-based precision fires: GMLRS, SDB II, LRPF, IRBM</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed GLCM batteries for littoral anti-ship and land attacks</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) for joint AMD</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed high-capacity directed energy UAV and missile defenses</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added mobile camouflage &amp; active protection for armored forces</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Patriot battalions</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward-based ABCTs and more PREPO in Europe</td>
<td>+2/+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded forward-based and PREPO afloat fires brigades</td>
<td>+3/+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established partner advise and assist force (brigade HQs); increased SOF units for FID</td>
<td>+4/+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Added combat aviation brigades to sustain distributed forces</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured UAS for ISR and logistics</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic choices: Air Force

Trends

- Threats to airbases and tanker tethers increase need for combat aircraft with longer ranges, greater endurance, and larger payloads
- “First look/shot/kill” BVR intercepts shape counterair system-of-systems; active & passive means to avoid detection; networked sensors; manned-unmanned teaming
- Persistently high OPTEMPO stressing the force >>> readiness declining, airframes wearing out faster than replacement, pilot retention issues
- Threats to high-power emitters and space-based systems drive need for new EW capabilities, disaggregated command and control/battle management, networking, and increased autonomy

Investment decisions

- Prioritized family of long-range strike systems and multi-mission enablers, including penetrating UAS; increased PGMs for protracted campaigns and invested in next-gen precision strike enablers to prevail in salvo competitions
- Addressed pilot and aircraft shortages, stresses of sustained operations – procured low-cost fighter, restarted F-22 production, sustained F-35A procurement, enlarged pilot and support personnel pool
- Invested in air base defenses including hardening, dispersal, deception, and active defenses (joint USAF & Army active defense investments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated B-21, procure more than 100 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed and deployed stealthy ISR UAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured penetrating UCAVs for surveillance and strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured new long-range air-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Started line for F-22+, began development of new Penetrating Counterair Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retained A-10s to support current operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created low-cost fighter force for steady-state operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base resiliency, including rapid repair, hardening, CCD, and procuring active defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded joint basing in partner countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressed pilot shortage by increasing end strength</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategic choices: Navy & Marine Corps

Trends

• Growing need for theater deterrence forces to reassure allies, prevent crises from escalating, and provide lethal effects in conflicts
• Unmanned and other technologies offer new options for undersea warfare
• Increasing threat to theater logistics hubs and resupply vessels
• Growing reliance on USMC as “9-1-1” crisis response force and for distributed operations in contested areas; decreasing likelihood of amphibious landings

Investment decisions

• Grew battle force fleet from current 272 ships to 384 ships; shifted from LCS towards new frigates & unmanned surface vessels, added fast missile craft, increased forward-stationing of small surface combatants
• Expanded SSN production and invested in a family of UUVs as well as undersea payloads and infrastructure
• Invested in longer-range carrier aviation to restore the Navy’s offensive punch; expanded ASW capabilities
• Implemented new approach to fleet defense - invested in higher capacity, medium-range kinetic & non-kinetic defenses
• Major expansion of Combat Logistics Fleet, invested in at-sea VLS replenishment and tender support

Investment Highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Highlights</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated <em>Ford</em>-class carrier build</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured next-generation UAS, including a carrier-based stealth UCAV for ISR and strike</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated SSN procurement</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured USVs, seabed mission modules, and a family of UUVs including XLUUVs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invested in littoral sensor arrays for ASW in high-threat areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed post-LCS frigate, forward stationed with Blue/Gold crewing</td>
<td>+20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add fast missile and patrol craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew Maritime Patrol Aircraft fleet</td>
<td>+40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielded higher-capacity fleet AMD, including DE and gun-launched HVPs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed at-sea VLS replenishment and special VLS tenders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded Combat Logistics Fleet to sustain combat operations</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procured sub-tenders &amp; tending ships for UUV/USV operations</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Strategic Choices

**Trends**
- O&M growing faster than inflation; compensation and healthcare growing as % of DoD budget
- Longer lead times for R&D transitions to program of record
- Significant over-capacity in infrastructure as opportunity cost for future modernization

**Initiatives**
- Large plus-up in 6.1-6.3 S&T funding to maintain technical edge
- 2005-style BRAC to cut excess infrastructure and personnel
- Restored shipyard and depot maintenance to near 100% of requirements in base budget to protect asset service life and increase availability; increased flying hours and OPTEMPO
- Privatized TRICARE for dependents & retirees, reduced commissary subsidies
- 5% cut in Unified Combatant Command staffs; 3% cut in service support contractors; additional civilian reductions

**Highlights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highlights</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Increased S&amp;T funding</td>
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<td>Increased DARPA activity</td>
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<td>Initial BRAC spending</td>
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<td>BRAC upkeep &amp; personnel savings over over 10 years</td>
<td>&gt;$65B</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reforms &amp; personnel reduction savings over 10 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased base budget funding for ship maintenance</td>
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<td>Increased funding for aircraft maintenance</td>
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<td>Increased base budget for vehicle and equipment depots</td>
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<td>Increased base budget for OPTEMPO &amp; flying hours</td>
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Adjustments to PB17 over next decade

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<th>Air &amp; Operations Forces</th>
<th>Special Operations Forces</th>
<th>Forces Hardening, &amp; Resiliency</th>
<th>Offensive Munitions &amp; Interceptors</th>
<th>Space, Communications, Cyber, &amp; EW</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Research &amp; Development</th>
<th>Readiness &amp; OCO-to-Base</th>
<th>Base Realignment &amp; Closure</th>
<th>Reforms &amp; Reductions</th>
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**Net Adjustment**

- **FYDP 1**: $217.0B
- **FYDP 2**: $355.3B

**Program Investments**

- Air
- Sea
- Ground
- Air & Missile Defense
- Special Operations Forces
- Forces
- Hardening, & Resiliency
- Offensive Munitions & Interceptors
- Space, Communications, Cyber, & EW
- Strategic
- Research & Development
- Readiness & OCO-to-Base
- Base Realignment & Closure
- Reforms & Reductions

**Associated Personnel**

- Program Investments
- Program Divestments
- Associated Personnel
- Associated Personnel
Team Sage Grouse

Team Lead: Todd Harrison
Team Advisors: Mark Cancian and Andrew Hunter
Guiding Principles

• Rebalancing should be strategy-driven AND resource-constrained
  • Should spend as much as is necessary and prudent, but no more
  • Any caps on the defense budget should reflect this

• End the use of OCO to supplement base budget activities
  • Move ~$30B / year of “forward presence and readiness” OCO funding back into the base budget
  • Use OCO only for the incremental cost of contingencies

• Push for “efficiencies” but don't assume any savings until accomplished

• Nothing is sacred, rethink old assumptions, and ruthlessly repurpose or divest “wasting assets”
Priority Roles and Missions

1. Protect the homeland
2. Protect U.S. vital interests around the world, including U.S. citizens and treaty commitments to allies
3. Provide a stabilizing balance in key regions when needed
4. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations
Key Threats

• Near-term
  - Russian creeping aggression / hybrid warfare in eastern Europe
  - Chinese “grey zone” aggression / territorial claims in South China Sea
  - North Korean / Iranian provocations
  - Global terrorist organizations and ungoverned space
  - Political instability and unrest among allies and partners

• Long-term
  - Weakening of U.S. power projection capabilities due to proliferation of precision-guided missiles & munitions, EW, cyber and counter-space capabilities
  - Growing power projection capabilities, reach, and influence of rival nations
  - Challenges to rules-based global system and U.S. network of alliances
  - Proliferation of nuclear weapons and loss of nuclear “taboo”
  - Potential collapse of key states and the spread of disorder
Summary of Strategy

• Focus on **major military competitions**
  - Provide a credible deterrent against China, Russia, North Korea, Iran
  - Maintain and extend operational and technological advantages in key areas of military competition (space, cyber, air, and undersea)
  - Work with allies to develop complementary capabilities and capacity

• Posture for **selective engagement**
  - Less emphasis on large-scale forward presence for other regional threats
  - Put a “thumb on the scale” but not necessarily “boots on the ground”
  - Be prepared to deploy rapidly when needed with relevant enabling capabilities (C2, ISR, logistics, munitions)
  - Be prepared to deal with the effects of disorder
    - Work with allies/partners to improve stability in critical areas
    - Integrate military approaches with other instruments of U.S. power
## Capability Priorities

- Rebalance to a high-low mix of capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Contested Environment</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Cyber/Intel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Stealthy, long-range strike and ISR</td>
<td>• SSNs/SSGNs</td>
<td>• Long-range fires</td>
<td>• Strategic protected SATCOM and missile warning</td>
<td>• Offensive cyber teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Stealthy tanking</td>
<td>• UUVs</td>
<td>• Land-based air &amp; missile defense</td>
<td>• Hosted payloads for tactical protected SATCOM, missile warning, and PNT resilience</td>
<td>• Defensive cyber teams</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stealthy unmanned strike and ISR</td>
<td>• Sub-based nuclear deterrent</td>
<td>• Land-based national missile defense</td>
<td>• Commercial Narrowband SATCOM</td>
<td>• National infrastructure protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Airborne nuclear deterrent</td>
<td>• Sea-based missile defense</td>
<td>• SOF</td>
<td>• Commercial Wideband SATCOM</td>
<td>• Intel fusion, integrated C2</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advanced munitions</td>
<td>• Advanced munitions &amp; sensors</td>
<td>• Armor in A/C</td>
<td>• Counter WMD</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less Contested Environment</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Cyber/Intel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Non-stealthy strike &amp; ISR</td>
<td>• Sealift</td>
<td>• Pre-positioned equipment sets</td>
<td>• Commercial Narrowband SATCOM</td>
<td>• Offensive cyber teams</td>
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<td>• Non-stealthy unmanned strike and ISR</td>
<td>• Amphibs</td>
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<td>• Commercial Wideband SATCOM</td>
<td>• Defensive cyber teams</td>
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<td>• Airlift and tanking capacity</td>
<td>• Small surface combatants</td>
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<td>• National infrastructure protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Airborne Warning / C2</td>
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<td>• Intel fusion, integrated C2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rotary-wing attack / lift</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Bold text = new or increased investment**

**Regular text = sustained investment**
Budget Rebalancing Summary

Net Increase from PB17 Baseline

FY18-22: +$214B
$30B/yr from OCO
$13B/yr new investment

FY23-27: +$247B
$30B/yr from OCO
$19B/yr new investment
### Changes in Force Structure from Baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army End Strength (AC/RC):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aircraft Carriers:</strong> -1</td>
<td><strong>Aerial Refueling:</strong> +20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+15K/-33K</td>
<td><strong>Amphibious Ships:</strong> --</td>
<td><strong>Airlift:</strong> --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2/-3</td>
<td><strong>Attack Subs (SSNs):</strong> +2</td>
<td><strong>Stealthy Manned Bombers:</strong> +5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5/+4</td>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missile Subs (SSBNs):</strong> --</td>
<td><strong>Stealthy Manned Fighter/Attack:</strong> -240</td>
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<tr>
<td>+2/-2</td>
<td><strong>Cruise Missile Subs (SSGNs):</strong> +3</td>
<td><strong>Stealthy Unmanned ISR/Strike:</strong> +150</td>
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<td>Combat Aviation Bgd (AC/RC):</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td><strong>Legacy Manned Bombers:</strong> -20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short-Range Missile Bn (AC/RC):</td>
<td>+4/--</td>
<td><strong>Legacy Manned Fighter/Attack:</strong> +160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-Range Missile Bn (AC/RC):</td>
<td>+6/--</td>
<td><strong>Non-Stealthy Unmanned ISR/Strike:</strong> -6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USMC End Strength (AC/RC):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Large Surface Combatants:</strong> -6</td>
<td><strong>Non-Stealthy Manned ISR/ASW/C2:</strong> +45</td>
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<tr>
<td>-6K/-4K</td>
<td><strong>Small Surface Combatants:</strong> --</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC Amphibian Bn (AC/RC):</td>
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<td>USMC Armored Bn (AC/RC):  -2/-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC Artillery Bn (AC/RC):</td>
<td>--/--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Aviation Group (AC/RC):</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Infantry Bn (AC/RC):</td>
<td>--/--</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USMC End Strength (AC/RC):</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support:</strong> +13</td>
<td><strong>Missile Def. / Nuclear</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air</strong></td>
<td><strong>Space/Cyber</strong></td>
<td><strong>Long-Range AMD Bat (AC/RC): +4/--</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aerial Refueling:</strong> +20</td>
<td><strong>Narrowband (Mil/Comm):</strong> -1/+7</td>
<td><strong>Medium-Range AMD Bat (AC/RC): --/--</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Airlift:</strong> --</td>
<td><strong>Wideband (Mil/Comm):</strong> --/+7</td>
<td><strong>Short-Range AMD Bat (AC/RC): +35/--</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stealthy Manned Bombers:</strong> +5</td>
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<td><strong>ICBM Wings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stealthy Manned Fighter/Attack:</strong> -240</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Risks

• Political
  • Continued budget pressures could limit resources available
  • Movements of forces between AC / RC would be unpopular in Congress
  • Reductions to major acquisition programs could be blocked

• Strategic
  • “Black Swan” event, especially in cyber or space
  • Rapid collapse of a major power and ensuing disorder

• Programmatic
  • Cost overruns and schedule delays are a constant challenge
  • New technologies may not mature as anticipated
  • Growing O&M costs could limit investments in new capabilities
Comparison of Team’s Choices
Budget Overview

Discretionary Budget Authority in FY17 Dollars

PB 12
PB 17
BCA Caps
AEI
CSBA
CSIS
CNAS
Cato

FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY17 Billions $</th>
<th>050 Total</th>
<th>% Difference from PB 17</th>
<th>$ Difference from PB 17</th>
<th>050 Spending as % of GDP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PB17</td>
<td>$5,663</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>$6,752</td>
<td>119%</td>
<td>$1,089</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cato</td>
<td>$4,702</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>$(961)</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNAS</td>
<td>$5,773</td>
<td>102%</td>
<td>$109</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSBA</td>
<td>$6,174</td>
<td>109%</td>
<td>$511</td>
<td>2.82%</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>$6,075</td>
<td>107%</td>
<td>$412</td>
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<td>PB12</td>
<td>$6,434</td>
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<td>$771</td>
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<td>BCA Caps Modified by October 2015 BBA</td>
<td>$5,481</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>$(182)</td>
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</table>
Overview of Rebalancing

- AEI ($1,302)
- Cato (-$1,070)
- CNAS ($121)
- CSBA ($572)
- CSIS ($454)

Adds: $1,352
Cuts: $49.76

Adds: $410
Cuts: $37

Adds: $754
Cuts: $288.30

Adds: $753
Cuts: $181.83

Adds: $753
Cuts: $299.37
*CSIS readiness spending reflects shifting funding for enduring requirements to the base budget. While counted under the readiness category, the enduring requirements shifted to the base budget encompass more than just readiness spending*
**Active Duty Army**

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<th>SBCTs</th>
<th>IBCTs</th>
<th>SR Fires Battalions</th>
<th>LR Fires Battalions</th>
<th>SR &amp; MD AMD Batteries</th>
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## Air

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Stealthy</th>
<th>Non-Stealthy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stealthy Bombers</td>
<td>+15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Stealthy Bombers</td>
<td>-60</td>
<td>-73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stealthy Fighter/Attack</td>
<td>+960</td>
<td>-1160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Stealthy Fighter/Attack</td>
<td>-1280</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stealthy Unmanned ISR/Strike</td>
<td>+180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Stealthy Unmanned ISR/Strike</td>
<td>+485</td>
<td>-90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FY23-27 Planned

- **Stealthy**
  - Bombers: 2453
  - Fighter/Attack: 1598
  - Unmanned ISR/Strike: 2120

- **Non-Stealthy**
  - Bombers: 1537
  - Fighter/Attack: 2692
  - Unmanned ISR/Strike: 2573

- **Total**
  - Stealthy: 7081
  - Non-Stealthy: 6865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stealthy</th>
<th>Non-Stealthy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY23-27 Planned</td>
<td>7081</td>
<td>6865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table above represents the strategic choices for different types of aircraft, indicating the change in numbers for each category.
## Surface Vessels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AEI</th>
<th>CATO</th>
<th>Center for a New American Security</th>
<th>CSBA</th>
<th>CSIS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Aircraft Carriers</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious Ships</strong></td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Logistics Force</strong></td>
<td>+20</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Large Surface Combatants</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Small Surface Combatants</strong></td>
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<td>-20</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>+39</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Undersea Vessels

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<th>CSBA</th>
<th>CSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack Subs</strong></td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+13</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise Missile Subs</strong></td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long Endurance UUVs</strong></td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towed Payload Modules</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Littoral Sensor Arrays</strong></td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine Tender</strong></td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SURTASS Ship and LFA Sonar Systems</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deep Sea Payload Pod</strong></td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towed Payload Modules</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Extra-Large Displacement UUV</strong></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Littoral Seabed Support Modules</strong></td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+7</td>
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### Strategic Forces

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>AEI</th>
<th>CATO Institute</th>
<th>Center for a New American Security</th>
<th>CSBA</th>
<th>CSIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B61 Life Extension</strong></td>
<td>Funded</td>
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<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>F-35 Nuclear Mods</strong></td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>Delayed</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ICBM Wings</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ohio-Class SSBNs</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LRSO Program</strong></td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Munitions Buy</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Accelerate Program</td>
<td>Increase Munitions Buy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Minuteman Replacement</strong></td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trident II D5 Mods</strong></td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cert Training for B-52s</strong></td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Canceled</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
<td>Funded</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cert Training for Fighters</strong></td>
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### Active Duty Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AEI</th>
<th>CATO Institute</th>
<th>CSBA</th>
<th>CSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td>+17K</td>
<td>-98K</td>
<td>+2K</td>
<td>+27K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>+72K</td>
<td>-100K</td>
<td>-1K</td>
<td>+55K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corp</strong></td>
<td>-34K</td>
<td>-59K</td>
<td>-8K</td>
<td>+5K</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td>+26K</td>
<td>-65K</td>
<td>-10K</td>
<td>+10K</td>
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#### Pay Raises

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tricare</strong></td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commissary Subsidy</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### FY23-27 Planned

- **Air Force**: 323, 317, 182, 450
- **Army**: 339, 293, 522, 216
- **Marine Corp**: 258, 219, 123, 350
- **Navy**: 313, 319, 174, 449

- **Air Force**: 333, 344, 187, 505
- **Army**: 321, 310, 176, 465
Readiness Funding

*CSIS readiness spending reflects shifting funding for enduring requirements to the base budget. While counted under the readiness category, the enduring requirements shifted to the base budget encompass more than just readiness spending.*
Space/Cyber and R&D Common Choices

**Space/Cyber/Comms**
- Add Land-Based Mobile EW Systems
- Add Rapidly Deployable Low Cost Protected SATCOM Terminals
- Add Cyber Combat Mission Teams
- Develop and Deploy Joint Aerial Layer Network Technologies

**R&D**
- Increase Funding for Advanced Undersea Warfare Technologies
- Increase Funding for Cyberspace, Network Warfare, and Machine Intelligence Technologies
- Increase Funding for High-Power Electric Laser Weapon Technologies

Just Focusing on Systems and Technology, Four teams selected:
Top 5 Adds/Cuts Overall

- Move OCO Funding for Enduring Requirements to Base Budget
- Add New F-22s (Active Component)
- Increase F-35A Lightning II Buy
- Increase Navy Ship Depot Maintenance Funding
- Increase F-35B Lightning II Buy
- Delay Ohio Replacement by 3 Years
- Reduce F-35C Lightning II Buy
- Privatize TRICARE for Military Retirees, Dependents, & Reserve Component
- Cut Service Support Contractors
- Reduce F-35A Lightning II Buy
Top 5 Adds/Cuts Selected by Min 3 Teams

- Develop and Deploy Stealthy, Carrier-based N-UCAS
- Increase Submarine Buy - Virginia-Class SSN with Payload Module
- Increase Long Range Strike Bomber/B-21 Buy
- Increase Navy Ship Depot Maintenance Funding (Move 2)
- Increase Air Force Depot Maintenance (Move 2)
- Reduce F-35A Lightning Buy (Move 2)
- Cut Service Support Contractors (Move 1)
- Reduce F-35C Lightning Buy (Move 2)
- Reduce LCS Buy (Move 1)
- Cut Infantry BCT (A/C)