Economist Debate: China’s Military

The Proposer’s Opening Remarks

For two decades East Asia has experienced an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity thanks to the political stability underwritten by America. China has arguably been the principal beneficiary of this stability, as reflected in its remarkable economic growth. Indeed, since the end of the cold war each American administration has sought to engage China in the hope that Beijing would become a "responsible stakeholder" in an international system that emphasises the peaceful resolution of disputes among nations and recognises the common interest all nations have in the effective functioning of a global economy.

A central element of China's response has been to undertake a major military build-up, now in its second decade, even while hundreds of millions of its citizens still languish in poverty. China is the only major power engaged in such a build-up. It is also the only great economic power under the grip of authoritarian rule.

While China's leaders profess they are engaged in "peaceful development", both the capabilities being fielded by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the government's recent actions suggest otherwise. For example, the PLA is developing the means to target the American military's information networks, which rely heavily on satellites and the internet to conduct and support operations. The Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite missile in 2007, and have reportedly used lasers to temporarily blind American satellites. America and its East Asian allies and partners have also been subjected to increasingly frequent cyber-attacks originating in China. These attacks have a number of objectives, including identifying military vulnerabilities.

The Chinese are developing and fielding so-called anti-access/area-denial capabilities to threaten American and allied forces out to the "second island chain", a line that extends as far east as Guam. The PLA has fielded ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike American facilities from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.

The PLA also seeks to restrict American and allied navies' freedom of action in international waters. To detect naval vessels at progressively greater distances, the PLA is constructing over-the-horizon radar and deploying reconnaissance satellites. To stalk American carriers and the surface warships tasked with protecting them, China's navy is producing growing numbers of submarines equipped with advanced torpedoes and high-speed, sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles. And the PLA is developing a ballistic missile designed to strike ships at sea.

The PLA's actions can hardly be explained away as a response to an American arms build-up. If anything, over the past decade the United States, consumed with its "global war on terrorism", has focused most of its energies on its ground forces, which pose no threat to China, in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Rather, the PLA's growing capabilities are designed to slowly, but inexorably, shift the regional military balance in China's favour until its neighbours conclude that there is little America can do to assist them if China engages in acts of coercion. This is consistent with China's strategic culture. As its great military theorist, Sun-tzu, famously observed, "To win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

While the Chinese government asserts that its intentions are benign, its recent actions suggest a growing aggressiveness to match its expanding military power. We are beginning to see what a China-dominated western Pacific would look like. Witness China's declaration that its "core interests" now include nearly all of the South China Sea's 1.3m square miles, or its refusal to accept North Korea's culpability for sinking a South Korean warship despite the evidence provided by an international investigation. At a 2010 international summit, Yang Jiechi, China's foreign minister, bluntly dismissed Singapore's concerns over China's growing territorial claims declaring: "China is a big country, and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." One PLA general has gone so far as to state publicly that China should simply occupy disputed islands, militarise them and establish a new administrative zone over them.

This increasingly aggressive behaviour has convinced many countries in the region that relying solely on engaging the Chinese government diplomatically and economically is not sufficient to maintain stability. Virtually every country has begun augmenting its military forces, a development that is widely attributed to growing concerns over China's rapidly expanding military capabilities.

Belatedly, the American government has concluded that engagement must be balanced by active efforts to maintain regional stability. This is reflected in the Obama administration's decision to increase its emphasis on preserving the military balance in East Asia. America's goal and that of its partners is a simple one: sustain the conditions that have provided for the security and welfare of all states, rather than witness the emergence of a new order that benefits one state at the expense of others.

The Proposer’s Rebuttal Remarks

My distinguished opponent, Shen Dingli, presents several arguments to which I would like to respond. To his credit, Mr. Shen admits, "It is understandable that China's increased [military] capacity might lead some to be concerned." But he assures us that such concerns are unfounded since: "A threat is the product of intent as well as capacity, and China has no such threatening intent." We are also told that China's military focuses primarily on peacekeeping activities.

But many of the capabilities being fielded by the People's Liberation Army—including the most sophisticated and expensive—are hardly suited for peacekeeping operations. It is not only China's growing military power that concerns its neighbours, but the kind of military capabilities being fielded. Why is China testing anti-satellite weapons, including its 2007 destruction of a satellite that created large amounts of debris threatening other nations' space systems? Why is China deploying ballistic missiles whose ranges far exceed the distance to Taiwan, and that place countries like Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines well within their range? Why is China engaged in cyber-economic warfare against both its neighbours and most of the world's technologically advanced nations?

Mr. Shen argues that other nations should place faith in China's good intentions, implying that they should ignore the old adage that "capabilities change slowly, but intentions can change overnight". Intentions can indeed change quickly, especially in non-democratic states where power resides in the hands of an unelected few. China's actions speak louder than words. A state's military capabilities often provide insights into a country's true intentions. As such, China's neighbours have good reason to be concerned.

Given these facts, is it any surprise that China's build-up is triggering a military response from other states in the region which are unwilling to entrust their security to its professed benign intentions? Simply stated, China's military build-up is viewed by many of these countries as unjustified by any clear threat to its security. Rather, it is China that is provoking a regional arms race through its actions.

Mr. Shen cites China's participation in UN peacekeeping operations as a sign of its peaceful intentions, yet fails to note that China has repeatedly used its permanent seat on the Security Council to protect corrupt regimes that ruthlessly suppress their people, including those in Iran, Syria and—especially—North Korea. Moreover, all three countries have been accused of secretly seeking to develop nuclear weapons. China has a long history of supporting such activities, particularly in the case of Pakistan, which itself became a supplier of nuclear-related materials to these countries.

Finally, we are told that China's expanding territorial claims should be discounted since in the past it has made territorial concessions. Mr. Shen asserts, "A country conceding territory to its neighbours is not the kind of country that can be considered a threat." He notes that over the past 60 years China has made territorial concessions to North Korea, Vietnam and Burma.

Yet upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that China's actions were motivated by hard-headed calculations reflecting a deep appreciation of power relationships. China accepted less than 50% of the disputed territory when its dispute with Burma was resolved in 1960. However, the agreement included a clause allowing the PLA to conduct operations against Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma, and compelled the Burmese military to do the same. Only two years later China began actively supporting the Burmese communists in their insurgency to overthrow Burma's government.

Yes, China did transfer an island to North Vietnam during its war against a South Vietnamese regime backed by America. Again, this was not an example of its altruism or good will, but raw power politics. China's leaders had a bigger geopolitical picture in mind: they were willing to make a minor short-term concession to achieve their primary goal of reducing American influence in the region. Once that was achieved, China seized Vietnam's Paracel Islands. Now China appears ready to exploit its growing power in claiming nearly all of the South China Sea as its preserve, at the expense of Vietnam (and others).

Contrary to Mr. Shen's claims, a study of China's maritime territorial disputes by M. Taylor Fravel finds that: "In its disputes over the Paracel (Xisha), Spratly (Nansha), and Senkaku (Diaoyu) island groups, China has consistently adopted a delaying strategy and never offered to compromise." Regarding China's signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, Mr. Fravel notes that "the agreement focused only on broad confidence-building measures, not sovereignty and dispute settlement".

As China's power has grown, its attitude and behaviour have changed as well. Increasingly, China is using threats and demands to advance its position. Just recently Major General Luo Yuan warned the Philippines that it was facing its "last chance" to resolve the dispute over the South China Sea claims. Actions like these hardly reflect a country committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Is it any wonder, then, that so many of China's neighbours are enhancing their defences and asking America to increase its presence in the region?

The Proposer’s Closing Remarks

Before providing my summary, permit me a few observations on my distinguished opponent's rebuttal.

Dingli Shen rightly notes that a country engaged in a military build-up should not necessarily be viewed as a threat. As he notes, "In terms of capability, America is the strongest, but does that mean it has threatened the world every day? Of course not."

Mr. Shen incorrectly argues that because America has certain capabilities in excess of the Chinese military's, then any effort by China to field similar capabilities on a comparable scale is inherently peaceful. But history shows this is not always the case. Between the two world wars Britain had the world's most powerful navy, while Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan sought to build up the power of their fleets. Yet it was not Britain but Germany and Japan that posed the threat to peace. America has used its power primarily for the public good—to keep the seas free for the use of all, to enable all to benefit from its global positioning system (GPS) satellites in space and to exploit the potential of the internet. Is it any wonder the countries of East Asia have embraced America more closely in the face of growing Chinese military power?

For one to believe that China's military build-up is not a threat to East Asian stability, one would have to be convinced that:

• China's neighbours in the region welcome China's growth in military capabilities. But its neighbours are emphatically not welcoming China's military build-up. After two decades of peace—thanks in large measure to the stability provided by the American military—China's military build-up is increasing the probability of military tensions and perhaps open armed conflicts in a region that has been largely at peace since 1979, when China invaded Vietnam. Rather, these countries are asking America to increase its military presence because of China's growing military capability and increasingly aggressive behaviour.
• China's military build-up will not jeopardise the spectacular economic growth and prosperity that most regional countries—China most of all—have enjoyed over the past several decades. It is hard to imagine how China's military build-up could possibly improve regional economic conditions. Over the past two decades, regional military spending has been historically low because many states were "free riding" on America's efforts to maintain regional stability. In contrast, China's military build-up is causing its neighbours to divert resources from economic growth to offset China's growing military capabilities.
• China's military build-up is only about Taiwan, and once China has resolved that issue to its satisfaction, it will accept the regional status quo. Yet China is developing power-projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and long-range missile systems, that suggest far greater ambitions. Indeed, by declaring the South China Sea a "core interest" on a par with Taiwan, China tips its hand to show it has far more expansive territorial designs in the region.
• China's military build-up does not pose a large opportunity cost for addressing China's more pressing societal concerns and responsibilities. But of course it does. Hundreds of millions of Chinese live in poverty. Water supplies are shrinking or becoming polluted. A rapidly ageing Chinese population still lacks a social safety net. Those who argue that China's military build-up does not pose a threat need to explain why its leaders, who have made economic growth—that is to say, the Chinese people's welfare—their stated priority, continue diverting ever greater resources to expanding the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in lieu of addressing such concerns.
• China will be a responsible stakeholder. Recent indications hardly provide confidence that this will prove to be true. When North Korean military forces sunk a South Korean ship, China kept silent. It has bullied Vietnam and the Philippines over conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. When Japan detained a Chinese captain whose fishing boat had rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship in Japanese territorial waters, China cut the supply of important rare earth metals to Japanese industries. It seems fanciful to believe that as China amasses more military power it will moderate this kind of behaviour; rather the opposite seems likely to obtain.
• There is no danger of Chinese super-nationalism. The legitimacy of the Chinese regime no longer rests on communist ideology. Nor do China's rulers enjoy popular support as a democratically elected government. Gravity-defying economic growth rates, which have been a source of legitimacy in recent decades, are likely to decline. That leaves the regime increasingly dependent on exploiting Chinese nationalism as the source of its legitimacy. Combined with the PLA's build-up, this would be a highly toxic mix, one that could hardly contribute towards regional stability.

In summary, the weight of evidence leads to the conclusion that China's military expansion is undermining the regional stability that has produced an era of peace and unparalleled prosperity. China's actions speak far louder than its words, as do the actions of most of its neighbours, which are now actively seeking to counter the PLA's "peaceful rise".