The Reserves and Homeland Security: Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead

The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the Defense Department’s efforts in counterterrorism and homeland security. The report is due to be released this month. A particular area of Congressional interest is the future use of the Reserve Component.1 Stretching back to their roots as colonial militias, America’s citizen-soldiers have historically played a key part in protecting the homeland. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many expect the role of the Reserves to be greatly expanded. Several major studies have already called for homeland security to become the Reserve Component’s primary mission.2 Will the Department of Defense heed their call? The department is not approaching the issue with a blank sheet of paper. The 1999 Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), the Defense Department’s most detailed, wide-ranging analysis of the Reserves’ potential contributions to homeland security, reveals what has been done so far and why the prospects for further change are not bright.

RCE-05 failed to achieve major reform, principally due to three barriers. The report did not:

  • make a compelling case for unique missions requiring specially organized and dedicated homeland security forces;
  • ameliorate anxiety that dedicating troops to homeland security would detract from warfighting missions; or
  • address concerns over the adequacy of resources for supporting homeland security tasks.
The Reserve Component played a prominent role in the response to 9/11, but there are few signs this effort will radically change the Defense Department’s approach to homeland security. Determining the best future use of the Reserves requires addressing the three major issues that hamstrung the efforts of RCE-05 and will also likely stifle future initiatives.

The Story Behind RCE-05 The Reserve Component represents 47 percent of the nation’s available military forces and consumes approximately 8.3 percent of the annual national defense budget. It consists of the Army and Air National Guard and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserves, totaling over 1,200,000 men and women.3 The National Guard of each state or territory is commanded by its governor. Governors can assign state missions as allowed by state constitutions and statutes. Individuals or units are called into federal service under either Title 32 or Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Title 32 covers federally funded, non-federal duty status, which includes periodic training periods and participation in Congressionally directed domestic programs such as drug interdiction. Under Title 10, Guard forces perform federal duty under the command of the President. Reserves are federal troops whose sole mission is to augment and reinforce active duty forces.

Most Reserve Component personnel spend only a limited amount of time performing military duties. The majority of units assemble one weekend per month and two weeks per year for training. Some Reserve members are called up to serve for several weeks or months. A few remain on active duty fulltime (often called fulltime manning), normally to provide support to Reserve forces. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2001 the “active reserve” accounted for 866,000 personnel, or 72 percent of the Reserve Component. The rest do no periodic service or training and are often referred to as the “inactive reserve.”4 Limited service makes the citizen-soldier, a tradition derived from the earliest colonial militias, still possible. Individuals can balance their military commitments with civilian employment while allowing the military to rapidly expand its capabilities in times of crisis.

Through their responsibilities for providing support to civilian authorities, Reserve Component forces, particularly the National Guard, play an important role in responding to natural and manmade disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, major industrial accidents and civil disturbances. At times, state missions can be substantial. The Florida National Guard employed 63 percent of its Army forces and 40 percent of its Air Force units in response to Hurricane Andrew’s devastation in 1992.5 Traditionally, however, the Reserve Component’s role in supporting state missions has been rather modest. States seldom employ large numbers of troops for extended periods. In 1993, for example, a year of above average use of the U.S. National Guard for state missions, state duty drew upon only six percent of its total strength.6 Two factors appear to govern the employment of the National Guard. First, states have relatively small budgets set aside for these missions or draw on a general contingency fund, which is usually well under $10 million.7 In addition, National Guard forces are usually brought in only when local capabilities to respond to a civil emergency are exhausted or insufficient.

The Reserve Component also conducts operations at the direction of federal authorities. In the last half century, however, major deployments have been relatively rare, and occurred only when state authorities requested assistance or were unwilling to enforce federal laws. The most common use of federal force was in cases of public disorder. One of the largest, during the 1971 May Day antiwar demonstrations in Washington, employed 2,000 guardsmen.8 The scale of this operation was unmatched until the 1992 Los Angles riots when over 10,000 guardsmen were called in to restore law and order.9

In the 1990s, the Reserve Component was assigned some specific homeland security missions. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 called for the Department of Defense to provide training for first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical treatment personnel) in 120 major U.S. cities.10 This mission was largely assigned to the National Guard. In addition, in November 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered that more specific measures be developed to integrate the Reserve Component into the department’s consequence management effort. The resulting plan, published in January 1998, led to the creation of ten Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams, later renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST).11 Each team contains 22 full-time Army and Air National Guard personnel. Their mission is to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. The teams can conduct surveys, surveillance and sampling, advise the on-the-scene civilian authority in charge, and provide communication and liaison with other DoD forces. In October 1998, Congress funded the project and later authorized additional teams, bringing the total number to 32.12 The Department of Defense transferred management responsibilities for the program to the National Guard Bureau. The Guard leadership has generally been supportive of the teams.13

Even before 9/11, there was a concerted attempt to dramatically expand the role of the Reserve Component in the service of homeland security. This effort was in part an unexpected consequence of the legislatively mandated Department of Defense 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Intended to refine the nation’s requirements for a post–Cold War military, the review virtually ignored the role of the Reserve Component, other than recommending cutting it by 55,000 personnel.14 The scope of the reductions in the Army (which has by far the largest Reserve forces) sparked a major controversy. At issue was the utility and relevance of Reserves, the appropriate distribution of resources, missions, and functions among service Components, and trust and confidence between the leadership of the National Guard and the Army leadership.

As part of the effort to diffuse the dispute and rationalize decisions over future Reserve force structure, in April 1998 Secretary of Defense William Cohen directed the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study. The study focused on employing the Reserve Component in support of three missions: major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies, and homeland defense.15 Completed the following year, the report recommended 20 follow-on actions, including further studies on the Reserves’ role in protecting the homeland.

After assuming office in 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deferred addressing the RCE-05 proposals until after his Defense Strategy Review.16 Nevertheless, the report remained important for two reasons. First, prior to September 11, it provided the blueprint for future DoD initiatives in the arena of homeland security. Second, its work informed the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called for “new emphasis” in drawing on the capabilities of the Reserve Component for homeland security missions.17 RCE-05 made four major recommendations with respect to homeland security.18

  • create homeland security units;
  • convert Air National Guard engineer units to consequence management forces;
  • create Reserve Component “virtual” organizations to support information operations; and
  • assign Reserve Component personnel to a standing joint task force headquarters for homeland security.
On July 22, 1999, Charles Cragin, acting assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, announced the completion of RCE-05, calling it “an important step in an ongoing and rigorous process of identifying new and better ways of using the Reserve Component.”19

The Fate of the Initiatives The RCE-05 proposals immediately became a subject of controversy. One objection was that the creation of homeland security forces might violate the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus prohibits federal forces from performing law enforcement activities without the permission of Congress. This was, perhaps, the least credible objection. The act has never been a serious obstacle to the use of federal forces for domestic operations, nor does it preclude the military from providing logistical support, loaning equipment, and offering technical advice, facilities, and training to civil authorities. Though there is much confusion in this area that might be addressed by more clearly stated and publicized policies, there is strong precedence to support using military forces for homeland security activities. The Posse Comitatus law and other strictures are not significant legal impediments to creating home defense forces.20

There were other concerns as well. The RCE-05 report catalogued potential objections to its recommendations in an annex to the study.21 Assigning homeland security tasks to the Reserves would create potential conflicts with other missions, such as supporting operations in major theater wars or smaller-scale contingencies. The cost of restructuring units for homeland security might be prohibitive. Preparations for homeland security might detract from readiness, leaving units unprepared for either warfighting or homeland defense. Another noteworthy objection was the claim that the Reserve Component is already capable of performing many missions that protect the homeland. In their role of providing domestic support to civil authorities, the National Guard and Reserves have performed many of the tasks associated with consequence management including providing physical security; population control and evacuation; search and rescue; erecting temporary shelters; delivering food and water; conducting fire fighting; and handling explosive and other hazardous material, all accomplished with on-hand equipment and with little additional training or preparation.

Finally, both service staffs and Reserve Component leaders were skeptical of the report’s findings. The services doubted additional resources would be available to reconfigure Reserve forces for homeland security tasks. For example, the Defense Planning Guidance, a key document for determining resource requirements, did not even address homeland security needs.22 Army National Guard leaders were wary as well. In recent years, the Army staff had been slow to shift funding priorities to reflect the increased use of Reserve forces. They were unconvinced that simply giving more missions to the Reserves would result in more funding for Reserve forces.23 In addition, leaders in the National Guard, already engaged in a concerted effort to stave-off the remaining personnel cuts mandated by the 1997 QDR, were reluctant to relinquish combat-related missions, which would be tantamount to admitting they had excess force structure.24

A brief review of the recommendations, in turn, reveals that they met with limited success.

  • Homeland Security Units. The report’s first proposal recommended assigning homeland security missions to Reserve Component commands. The report considered creating new missions, including “dual missioning” (assigning a unit a wartime and homeland security mission), “remissioning” (assigning homeland support duties as a primary mission), or “restructuring” (reorganizing a unit with different personnel and equipment specifically for homeland security tasks). The Army, which potentially had the most Reserve forces that could be reorganized as homeland defense units, looked at the issue most closely. The Army staff conducted a series of workshops, wargames, and meetings to flesh out possible requirements. But rather than recommending new units, the staff instead proposed providing some additional resources to enhance National Guard readiness for consequence management. Results were briefed and accepted by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in December 2001, but were not assigned a high priority and became “unresourced requirements.”25
  • Air National Guard Engineer Assets. The second RCE-05 proposal was to convert Air National Guard Bare Base Air Wings (Base Engineer Emergency Forces, or “Prime BEEF”) into teams for providing additional consequence management capabilities. Prime BEEF units were created in the 1960s to construct and operate airfields at austere locations. Their capabilities include fire fighting, disaster preparedness, and detection of chemical and biological attacks and decontamination. RCE-05 recommended using Reserve Prime BEEF units, as consequence management troops. The Air Force, however, was looking to expand the service’s capability to deploy its Air Expeditionary Forces to remote areas where bases might not be readily available. The Air staff concluded that it could not afford to divert deployable assets exclusively to homeland security missions. The service concluded Prime BEEF units could conduct consequence management missions with their existing force structure if the need arose.
  • Virtual Organizations. The RCE-05 team’s third major recommendation was to create Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organizations (JRVIOs) to support detecting and combating cyber-attacks. The proposal envisioned Reservists working part-time from remote locations as part of geographically distributed organizations providing a range of services from monitoring systems to augmentation for major incidents. The virtual organizations would capitalize on the existing skills of Reservists gained through civilian employment or military experience. The proposal resulted in a follow-on study that sketched out an operational concept and resource requirements.26 On December 6, 2000, the department authorized the formation of five JRVIOs staffed by 182 Reservists. Today, these organizations provide support to five agencies, but are not primarily employed as homeland security assets.27 They are used extensively to support offensive information operations and intelligence gathering, as well as protecting the Department of Defense information systems.
  • Joint Staffs. The fourth RCE-05 recommendation was to have Reserve Component personnel assigned to a joint task force headquarters for homeland defense. At the time of the report’s release all federally directed military support to civilian authorities was managed by the Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS) who served as the executive agent for the Department of Defense. In October 1999, as a result of changes in the Unified Command Plan, Joint Forces Command established Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-Civil Support) to provide command and control over Department of Defense forces responding to a WMD incident. In addition to writing doctrine and plans, the task force (about 100 personnel) was to be a deployable headquarters element that could go to the site of an attack to coordinate military operations supporting consequence management activities. Following the RCE-05 recommendation, Reserve Component personnel comprise a third of the task force’s complement. The upcoming Defense Department report on homeland security is expected to announce the establishment for a new undersecretary for homeland security who will probably assume the mission of DOMS and control of the DOMS staff (half of which are now National Guard positions). Meanwhile, JTF-Civil Support will transfer to Northern Command (NORTHCOM) when its headquarters is formally established on October 1, 2002. Concurrently, plans are underway to organize Joint State Task Force Headquarters under the State Adjutants General for consequence management and other civil support missions. These headquarters will act as interagency planners and coordinators at the state level.28 The Reserve Component contribution to NORTHCOM and its relationship with these organizations and the National Guard Bureau has not been finalized.
Enter 9/11 Four days after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the president authorized mobilizing Reservists for homeland security and civil support tasks. Troops performed a variety of missions. For example, over 6,000 National Guard troops assisted in screening at 400 airports, 1,600 soldiers augmented border security, thousands of Air National Guard and Reservists supported air patrols over major population centers, and other troops guarded critical facilities such as nuclear power plants, bridges, and tunnels.

JTF-Civil Support deployed a liaison team to New York City approximately three days after the 9/11 attacks. The city requested few Defense Department resources and the task force soon withdrew, handing coordination for the civil support mission over to a Department of Defense regional Defense Coordinating Officer. New York’s WMD-Civil Support Team also deployed to the city, but did not play a significant role.29

Currently, about 80,000 Reserve Component troops are mobilized (less than 7 percent of the total Reserve force). Less than half of the forces called up are employed in homeland security and civil support tasks. Other Reserve forces supported counterterrorism operations overseas and other operations worldwide.30

In some cases, homeland security operations have placed great demands on the Reserve Component. For example, 80 percent of the air crews conducting air patrols over the United States were from the Air National Guard. Additionally, the mobilization affected the readiness of some commands for other assigned missions, since in many cases individuals were taken from their regular units and diverted to homeland security details. It also created hardships for individuals called away from their civilian jobs for a prolonged period. Normally, mobilizations for domestic operations are relatively brief. Many of the troops called-up for the 9/11 response were activated for the maximum period allowed under the mobilization order, 180 days.

The legacy of the September 11 attacks for the Reserve Component is far from clear. For example, months after the event the Army’s Reserve Component Coordination Council concluded that future missions, capabilities, and requirements still remained undefined. They were also unsure where the money would come from to pay for new homeland security missions. “Funding streams,” the council concluded, “will be difficult to capture.”31

Evaluating the effectiveness of the 9/11 deployments will probably provide support for all sides of the debate over the future role of the Reserves and may offer few insights into how best to shape the future force. Some will argue that the Reserve Component’s contribution to counterterrorism operations overseas demonstrates the importance of maintaining robust deployable Reserve forces. They will also point out that the Reserves showed they could adequately support homeland security tasks without a major reorganization. In contrast, others can argue that only a fraction of the force was employed after September 11 and therefore the response offers few insights into the appropriate use the Reserve Component as a whole. They will continue to contend that the Reserve force structure is bloated, insufficiently trained, and inadequately organized and equipped to meet the nation’s future needs.

Assessment The achievements of RCE-05 were quite modest. Out of over a million Reserve Component troops, less than an additional thousand personnel were dedicated to the task of protecting the homeland. Three factors seem to have largely driven the results.

  • RCE-05 did not offer a compelling argument for unique missions requiring specially organized and dedicated homeland security forces. The study fell short of making the case that potential threats required units that were organized, trained, equipped, and employed substantially differently than current Reserve Component forces.
  • The report failed to ameliorate anxiety that dedicating troops to homeland security would detract from warfighting missions. There was no persuasive strategic rationale for shifting the balance in the Reserve Component’s traditional roles of supporting civil authorities when needed, while preparing for operational missions overseas.
  • RCE-05 did not address concerns over the adequacy of resources for supporting homeland security tasks. Spending on homeland security, at the time, was not a high budget priority for the Department of Defense.
Can the Defense Department approach homeland security in a new way that will allow it to address the seemingly intractable problems of threats, strategy, and budget? There are several key questions it might consider.

  • Is the Reserve Component, as currently organized, equipped and structured, prepared to respond to emerging threats to the homeland? One challenge is the potential proliferation of nuclear or virulent biological weapons that might be delivered by cruise missiles or covertly smuggled to a target by ground, sea, or air transport. These weapons could inflict catastrophic casualties, killing tens of thousands of people and causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, destruction on a scale far greater than any catastrophe that the Reserve forces have responded to before. The form of the disaster could also differ markedly, requiring troops to deal with contaminated people and property.32 The Department of Defense should take a hard look at whether it has Reserve forces adequately prepared to deal with catastrophic disaster.
  • Is the force balance right? The military is tasked with conducting a global counterterrorism campaign; preparing for major theater conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies; and providing forward presence; as well as supporting homeland security. All these requirements have to be addressed in determining the appropriate balance between the Active and Reserve Components. This assessment also needs to consider the requirement for “homeland security” overseas as well as at home. Many areas where U.S. forces might deploy may face the danger of nuclear, chemical, or biological strikes. Host countries could well lack the robust infrastructure required to respond to these attacks. Thus, American homeland security forces may also be needed to provide consequence management for civil populations in forward deployed areas. But while such forces may be required at home and abroad, it is not clear what priority they should hold among all the missions competing for people and resources. A key step in addressing this problem is to develop a comprehensive defense strategy that establishes priorities among the principal mission areas. In September 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks the Department of Defense published its Quadrennial Defense Review, which outlined the goals of a new military strategy. The discussion, however, only briefly addressed the issue of homeland security and offered no insight into how to balance warfighting and homeland security missions.33 A homeland security strategy is not due to be released until July, and the national security strategy will not be out before the autumn. All three strategies need to be fleshed out and harmonized, providing the Department of Defense an appropriate framework for deciding how to best utilize the capabilities of its Reserve forces.
  • Is there a method to insure appropriate funding for homeland security missions? The establishment of Northern Command could be used to help address this question. Unlike JTF-Civil Support, NORTHCOM will have responsibility for all tasks related to defending the homeland, including securing air space and territorial waters, as well as all military activities related to preventing and protecting against terrorists attacks and performing consequence management. NORTHCOM will generate plans and requirements just like other unified commands. In turn, NORTHCOM’s statement of requirements for forces and equipment will compete with the other commands through the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning system. Thus, homeland security needs should be better able to contend for resources with other defense demands. Alternatively, to ensure appropriate resources for homeland security NORTHCOM could be given an independent budget line in the same manner as the U.S. Special Operations Command. Another means to provide funding is for Congress to modify Title 32, creating a program similar to the congressionally-directed drug interdiction program. A homeland security Title 32 program would allow states to draft their own homeland security plans for employing National Guard forces that could then be submitted to appropriate federal agencies for approval. Once they were approved, operations would be conducted by National Guard forces mobilized under Title 32 and funded by Congress. The advantage of the Title 32 approach is that it would allow states to tailor programs to meet their individual needs.
  • Is there a better way? There may be alternative models for providing homeland security support, particularly for threats other than catastrophic attacks. For example, it might be far more efficient and cost-effective to rely on early warning, monitoring, and detection equipment to enhance the physical security of infrastructure than to employ ground, naval, and air forces as guards. In other cases, contracting services with the commercial sector might be more cost effective.
As typified by RCE-05, peering deep into the future and mapping out an appropriate role for the Reserve Component in homeland security has not been the driving force in shaping the Defense Department’s recommendations to date. The department’s report to Congress this month will have to offer up better ways for employing citizen-soldiers in defense of the homeland. This will require a comprehensive strategy which may lead to a significant reorganization of the Reserve Component and require substantial resources.

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For more information, contact James Jay Carafano at (202) 331-7990.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent public policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st Century. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich. For more information about CSBA, see our website at:

  1. Public Law 107-107 §1511.
  2. Kurt M. Campbell and Michéle A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2001), p. 74; L. Paul Bremmer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American Homeland (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), p. 76. Even before 9/11 there were calls for making homeland security a major mission area for Reserves. See, The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map For National Security: Imperatives for Change, Phase III Report (February 15, 2001), p. 77. This report issued a general recommendation that the Reserve Component be assigned a primary role in homeland security and they should be “trained and equipped to respond as deployable forces to natural, manmade, and/or WMD-triggered disasters.”
  3. These figures do not include the Coast Guard Reserve which comprises approximately 13,000 personnel.
  4. For an explanation of Reserve Component status see, [].
  5. Roger Allen Brown, et al., Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 40.
  6. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1993 (January 1994), p. 57.
  7. Brown, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, p. 35.
  8. John Dowling, ed., Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1987).
  9. The riots and the military response are described in James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, FL: ETC Publications, 1995).
  10. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, PL 104-201. This law is also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.
  11. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or conventional high explosive attacks. Consequence management includes the ways and means to address the physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects of a WMD event. It can involve both the initial response to an attack and post-strike recovery.
  12. For issues involved in establishing the teams see, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Audit Report: Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (D-2001-043, January 31, 2001); Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Testimony: Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threat and Capabilities on National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, (D-2001-113, May 1, 2001).
  13. See, for example, National Guard Association of the United States, Fiscal Year 2003 Legislative Priorities, pp. 3-4.
  14. The proposed cuts were 45,000 Army, 4,100 Navy, 700 Air Force, and 4,200 Marine.
  15. The Department of Defense does not have official definitions for the term homeland security and homeland defense. Secretary of the Army Thomas White, acting executive agent for these efforts, defines homeland defense as those homeland security tasks in which the Defense Department assumes the role of lead federal agency. An example would be missile defense. See, News Transcript, Secretary White Briefing on Homeland Security, October 26, 2001, [].
  16. Department of the Army, DAMO-SSW, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Subject AC/RC Integration Item 00-120, RCE05, 1 June 2001.
  17. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 30, 2001), p. 19.
  18. In addition to homeland security missions, RCE-05 also recommended using Reserve Component personnel for missile defense missions. Under current plans, a missile defense brigade in Alaska with a complement of about 200 National Guard personnel will be operational in 2008. For an overview see, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Harnessing The Power of Technology, The Road to Ballistic Missile Defense From 1983-2007 (September 2000), [].
  19. “Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study Completed,” DoD News Release, July 22, 1999, [].
  20. For more on this debate see, Mathew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Summer 1997, p. 3, []; Jeffrey D. Brake, “Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2001, p. 11-18; Craig T. Trebilcock, “Posse Comitatus—Has the Posse Outlived Its Purpose?” Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group, 2000, pp. 1-5.
  21. See, Annex C, Missioning RC Units for WMD CM and Critical Infrastructure Physical Security.
  22. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 94.
  23. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Forces, But Challenges Remain, (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-162), p. 13.
  24. For reaction to the QDR see, Chris Anderson “QDR Looms Large at NGAUS Executive Council Meeting,” National Guard, (January 1997 p. 23-24. The uncompleted personnel cut amounted to 25,000 spaces. These reductions were eventually deferred.
  25. Department of the Army, DAMO-SSW, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Subject AC/RC Integration Item 98-92, Homeland Security, March 11, 2002.
  26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05): Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO) for Department of Defense Mission Support (October 13, 2000).
  27. The agencies supported by JRVIOs are the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Joint Task Force— Computer Network Defense, both in Arlington, Va.; the National Security Agency and the Information Operations Technical Center, both at Fort Meade, Md., and the Joint Information Operations Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.
  28. Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, p. 16.
  29. “JTF-CS Response to Terrorist Attacks on 11 September, 2001,” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin, December 2001, p. 11-12.
  30. On June 5, 2002, the total number currently on active duty in support of the partial mobilization after September 11 was 31,431; Naval Reserve, 9,011; Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, 36,977; Marine Corps Reserve, 4,144; and the Coast Guard Reserve 1,566; for a total of 83,129 including both units and individual augmentees. See, [].
  31. DAMO, SSW, Memorandum, subject: AC/RC Integration Item 98-2, Homeland Security, December 10, 2001.
  32. For a notional list of requirements for responding to a catastrophic attack see, Larsen and Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland, p. 60.
  33. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pp. 18-19.