The history of the twentieth century is littered with the carcasses of failed revolutions. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Mussolini, and Hitler all tried to master modernity—to curb or accelerate it—and all failed. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, it appeared the most consequential revolutionary of the last century might turn out to be Mustafa Kemal Pasha, better known as Atatürk, founder of the secular Republic of Turkey. Amidst the wreckage of the multinational Ottoman Empire, Atatürk emerged victorious, using bourgeois nationalism as a basis for reforming a Muslim country in an attempt to demonstrate that popular sovereignty and Islam could successfully coexist. That proposition remains to be disproven, but the Atatürk revolution itself died on April 16, 2017—the day Turkey's current president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, succeeded in his longstanding effort to transform the country's parliamentary government into an executive presidency.

“It was aimed at both our allies and adversaries, and it appears to have worked, to some degree,” said Eric S. Edelman, a former undersecretary of defense for policy during George W. Bush’s administration who now teaches at Johns Hopkins University. But Mr. Edelman drew some critical distinctions between the two presidents. Nixon’s “madman” act generally masked a calculated strategy, which is not yet evident in Mr. Trump’s approach. Nixon’s national-security team was better coordinated than Mr. Trump’s, at least so far. And even in Nixon’s case, the madman strategy worked better later in his presidency, when he and his aides were more seasoned.

The decade and a half the United States has spent fighting the “long war” in the Middle East has yielded many tactical successes but left a lasting victory elusive. The inconclusive nature of these struggles has sapped support for the U.S. policy of shouldering the burden of providing security and stability in the region. Although many believed U.S. involvement in the region resulted in more violence, disorder, and radicalization of local Arab populations, the current situation in the Middle East illustrates that inaction has been highly destabilizing. The United States must contend with two intertwined challenges in the region: Iranian aspirations for mastery in the Middle East and the Muslim world and often related violent jihadist terrorism. Both threaten the security of the broader Middle East and the U.S. homeland.

In a report on keeping Europe “whole and free” for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former ambassador Eric Edelman and Whitney M. McNamara advise (p. 47) that “NATO should consider . . . bringing back a version of the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and a new ALCM. The United States, for example, might consider developing a lighter, shorter-range version of its Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile to replace its aging ALCM. These weapons could become part of the NATO inventory delivered by dual-capable aircraft.” They continue, “The United States could also re-field tactical nuclear weapons in existing 155-mm howitzer battalions in the Baltics that are unable to hit deep Russian targets, enabling NATO forces to occupy a key position on a lower rung on the escalatory ladder. In addition, the United States should start the research and development of a new Pershing-3 ballistic missile.” Their bottom line: “In light of existing Russian breaks from the [INF] agreement, the United States should consider eventually withdrawing from the INF Treaty.”

The United States — preoccupied with the wars of the Middle East and a pivot to Asia — has largely left the global playing field to Russian President Putin and must now lead NATO by forging a new consensus on the Russian threat and investing in new weapons. The correlation of forces in the European theater has arguably not been this favorable for Russia since the end of the Cold War. The ability of U.S. and NATO forces to deter Russian aggression is declining and is, arguably, dangerously close to the threshold of acceptable risk in the Baltic States.

ABSTRACT: The authors discuss the erosion of US military primacy and the corresponding dangers for American grand strategy and international security. They analyze three options for restoring strategic solvency and recommend a signi cant expansion of US defense resources to bring capabilities back into alignment with US global commitments.