The U.S. military has enjoyed an enormous advantage in precision strike over the past 25 years. The success of America’s precision strike operations has not gone unnoticed, however. Potential enemies have invested in active and passive defenses that could force the U.S. military to fly more strike sorties and expend larger numbers of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in future wars.
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In this study, Dr. John Stillion conducts a historical analysis of air-to-air combat, drawing on a database of over 1,450 air-to-air victories from multiple conflicts from 1965 to the present. Using this data, Stillion assesses how advances in sensor, weapons, and communication technologies have changed air combat and the implications of these trends for future combat aircraft designs and operational concepts.
For over two decades, the U.S. military has enjoyed a near-monopoly in precision-guided weaponry and their associated battle networks. Recently, however, the proliferation of these capabilities to other militaries and non-state entities is gathering momentum.
This report describes how undersea competitions evolved over the last century, the disruptive trends that may lead to a new era in undersea warfare, and the elements that will comprise an effective approach to the next chapter in undersea competition.
Despite the recent ostensible improvements in relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, the deteriorating cross-strait military balance continues to worry leaders in Taipei. Taiwan is long past the point where it can simply buy its way out of what has become a structural security deficit. It urgently needs a radical rethink of its defense posture vis-a-vis China.
Within the next year, the Navy must take advantage of an uncommon opportunity to set the course for the future surface fleet or fall further behind competitors who will increasingly be able to deny U.S. forces access to their region.