The deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan over the coming months will require additional funding in Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10). It is difficult to precisely estimate the cost that will be incurred by the deployment due to a variety of factors including the composition of the forces deployed and the specific mission they are given. The adversary also has a say in determining the operational tempo of our forces, and thus the costs incurred in terms of such items as fuel, ammunition, and equipment. Still, historical trends in the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can provide a useful guide for making such an estimate.
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On June 25, 2009, the full House passed its version of the fiscal year (FY) 2010 national defense authorization act. The Senate passed its version of the bill on July 23, 2009. This Update provides a brief assessment of how these two bills compare, both to each other and to the administration’s request, and what issues remain to be resolved during conference. The administration’s defense budget request is still working its way through the House and Senate appropriations process.
This backgrounder offers some preliminary observations on the likely characteristics of the new program, and raises several questions that the Army will have to address as it goes forward.
Classified or “black” programs appear to account for about $35.8 billion, or 17 percent, of the acquisition funding included in the fiscal year (FY) 2010 Department of Defense (DoD) budget request (see Table, page 3). This total includes $18.1 billion in procurement funding and $17.7 billion in research and development (R&D) funding. These figures represent 14 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the total funding requested for procurement and R&D in FY 2010. Among other things, this analysis finds that:
It now appears likely that F-22 production will end with a procurement of 187 Raptors, of which 179 will be operational aircraft. The crucial moment came on July 21st, 2009, when the full Senate voted fifty-eight to forty to strip the $1.75 billion Senate defense authorizers had added to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 defense bill to keep F-22 in production. This vote came in the wake of intense lobbying by defense secretary Robert Gates and a veto threat from the White House should Congress continue F-22 production beyond FY 2009. In light of these developments, now seems as good a time as any to look back and try to take stock of the F-22 program. Are there any lessons to be learned, and where, if anywhere, is the program likely to go from here?
Secretary Gates termed the FY 2010 defense budget a “reform budget.” With today’s release of the detailed budget request, we begin to see what shape that reform will take and where he intends to lead the Department. This budget is a departure from the previous administration’s budgets in several ways: