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While costs are projected to grow over the next decade due to a "bow wave" of nuclear modernization programs, Harrison concludes that the search for savings in nuclear forces continues to be a "hunt for small potatoes."
For over two decades, the U.S. military has enjoyed a near-monopoly in precision-guided munitions and their associated battle networks. Recently, however, the proliferation of these capabilities to other militaries and non-state entities is gathering momentum. How will this emerging precision-strike regime impact the character of maritime warfare? In this backgrounder, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich summarizes and presents findings regarding the likely character of future maritime warfare and options for preserving U.S. freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain.
Secretary Hagel recently made waves in Army circles by suggesting that the Army leverage its missile forces to resume the old mission of coastal defense. In this brief, CSBA Research Fellow Eric Lindsey argues that Army missiles forces can do far more than defend coastlines.
With the United States now engaged in military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there are many questions regarding the cost, duration, and scope of these operations. This CSBA Backgrounder provides a range of estimates for the cost of military operations against ISIL to date and how much these operations may cost over the coming months.
This backgrounder discusses the balance the FY15 defense budget attempts to find among compensation, force structure, modernization, and readiness, and compare the choices made in this budget to the Joint Think Tank exercise CSBA hosted with three other think tanks in early February 2014.
Since World War II, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been able to count on America's defense industrial base (DIB) always being ready to design and produce the world-class weaponry on which the U.S. military has long relied. But the U.S. DIB is considerably smaller today than it was following the Cold War’s end. Now the Pentagon confronts a period of shrinking defense budgets at the same time the international security environment is posing new military challenges, such as the emergence of anti-access/area-denial capabilities, the growing threat to space-based systems, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Defense Department has never had a coherent, long-term strategy for sustaining the defense industrial base's core competencies. Absent a strategy that proceeds from deciding first what to keep rather than what to cut, the possibility is growing that a day will come when the country's industrial base will no longer possess all the critical design and manufacturing capabilities that the U.S. military needs.
Bryan Clark, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said the RFI “opens up the aperture too much” in terms of what that future frigate might look like.
“It makes it seem like it could be anything from … a relatively low-end ship or less capable ship, all the way up to a frigate that can do air defense for another ship and do anti-submarine warfare,” he said.
In an effort to save money, the Navy might buy a vessel with insufficient capabilities, he said.
The RFI “establishes a capability hierarchy that could support development of a less expensive and less capable ship that does not meet the Navy’s needs,” he said.
"There's a deep fundamental divide between the Freedom Caucus members in the House, the more mainline conservatives in the House and the Senate, and the Democrats in the House and Senate," said Katherine Blakeley, a research fellow at the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgeting Assessments.
Added Blakeley, "What exactly to do about defense spending is almost certainly going to get kicked down the road until about December," she said.
As Katherine Blakeley of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments explains in an analysis of the administration’s defense budget request, the legislative calendar that awaits lawmakers when they return from August recess provides little room to negotiate a compromise. Blakeley, and others, have noted that the most likely scenario a continuing resolution for the first months of fiscal 2018. And this is all taking place despite the president’s party holding majorities in both houses of Congress. It is also occurring as the United States continues to fight wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, ramps up counterterrorism operations elsewhere, and as the president threatens North Korea and, more recently, Venezuela.
The Army is the most sensitive to changes in the costs of military personnel because they account for more of its budget than other services, according to a new analysis from the think tank by Katherine Blakeley.
Donald Trump’s threat to rain “fire and fury” on North Korea as punishment for its military provocations is the epitome of irresponsible leadership. By invoking the prospect of apocalyptic destruction, Trump risks alienating U.S. allies, distracting attention from North Korean misbehavior, and escalating an already fraught situation.
The legislative calendar is running short and remains packed with difficult political issues such appropriations legislation, a debt ceiling increase, tax reform, and potentially another run at Obamacare repeal. That makes a continuing resolution covering several months likely, according to an analysis this month by Katherine Blakeley, a research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.