U.S.-Russian relations are worse today than at any time since the end of the Cold War — worse, indeed, than at any time since the dangerous years of the early 1980s. Crises and confrontations have become more the norm than the exception in recent years; the rhetoric in Washington and Moscow alike has become increasingly hostile.
The U.S. is rapidly heading down the path of confrontation with a rogue-state adversary, a potential foe that has proved rational yet ruthless in pursuit of its interests, including the aggressive development of its nuclear program and associated military capabilities. The rogue state this description best fits, however, may not be North Korea, but Iran.
Although increased capacity and lethality are the second priority of the Pentagon’s PB 2018 budget request behind restoring the readiness of the current force, funding for procurement increases far less than for RDT&E and operation and maintenance accounts (O&M) in real terms.[
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, George W. Bush worried less about rallying the nation to action against the terrorist threat than about warning an enraged public that the campaign would not end anytime soon. The president referred to the emerging “global war on terror” as a generational struggle—one that would go on well past his own tenure and one that would lack an emotionally satisfying endpoint such as V-J Day or the fall of the Berlin Wall.
ABSTRACT: The costs and risks associated with America’s military alliances have always been more visible and easily understood than the benefits. In reality, however, those costs and risks are frequently overstated, whereas the benefits are more numerous and significant than often appreciated. This article offers a more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing current policy debates.
The Defense Department acknowledges that America’s military is on the path toward becoming a hollow force. The signs: declining readiness, insufficient end strength, and aging weapon systems. It is also true that the Pentagon’s nuclear forces have absorbed more than their fair share of cuts since the end of the Cold War, including cuts that have eroded the ability of its bombers to support their strategic deterrence mission. The early termination of the B-2 stealth bomber program at 21 aircraft, about 16 percent of the original requirement, may be the most notorious of these decisions.