The Navy’s surface fleet is in need of some short-term payload adjustments to regain an advantage in offensive surface strike capabilities.
“The surface fleet today really can’t do offensive sea control,” said Bryan Clark, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a Washington think tank, and a former special assistant to the chief of naval operations, speaking to reporters Nov. 17.
Clark, author of the new CSBA assessment, “Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare,” said the Navy needs a short-term — meaning by 2025 — adjustment in its weapon payloads and modifications to some ships to enable the fleet to survive cruise missile swarm attacks and be able to take the offensive to achieve sea control. His recommendations are designed to shore up capability from the time the Ohio Replacement ballistic-missile submarine program dominates the shipbuilding budget until a new large surface combatant can be fielded in the 2030s.
He said the current payload of an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer or Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser is weighted toward defensive anti-air warfare, shooting expensive long-range missiles such as the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) and medium-range missiles such as the SM-2 at incoming cruise missiles, with the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) for terminal defense. Such a load-out of a ship’s Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells leaves little room for offensive weapons such as cruise missiles.
Saying that the U.S. fleet is at a “severe range disadvantage” in missile range compared with the missiles of potential adversaries, Clark advocates a return to a concept the dominated the Cold War, saying the Navy needs to “regain the ability to shoot the archer before he shoots his arrows.”
Clark said a ship needs to use long-range missiles such as the SM-6 to destroy the launch aircraft before they can release their cruise missiles. Instead of a layered defense, he advocates the ESSM being used to intercept the cruise missiles that do get launched.
Under this plan, a ship could reduce the number of long-range missiles and increase four-fold the number of ESSMs, which can be used to defeat swarms of missiles. A single VLS cell can carry four ESSMs, but only one Standard missile. The ESSM has a range of 30 nautical miles.
The use of more ESSMs would be a more affordable way to defeat swarm attacks, he said.
Clark supports development of laser weapons for the Flight III of the DDG 51 class and the electromagnetic rail gun for third Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer, Lyndon B. Johnson. He also proposes an additional four or five joint high-speed vessels as dedicated rail gun platforms that could be forward-deployed to support the fleet.
Clark also said the only affordable option for the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) program is a modified littoral combat ship (LCS). He recommends that some LCSs be back-fitted with VLS systems to give the fleet more punch. The mission packages should be separated from the LCS program and made deployable on a number of classes of ships.
Clark said both LCS designs would be suitable for modification, but noted that the Navy has more experience with steel hulls, such as is used by the Freedom class.
The recommended changes from the LCS to the SSC include a VLS array of 24 cells; a better 3-D radar; the anti-submarine warfare mission package; retention of the Mk110 gun; and a variable-depth towed sonar.
Clark also said the Navy needs a longer-range anti-submarine weapon than the Vertical-Launch Antisubmarine Rocket, which has a range of only 12 nautical miles.
He also advocates smaller warheads and an increased fuel load on the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile to enable it to attack at even longer ranges.
Pointing out that the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers are being overworked, including on low-end missions more suitable for a small combatant, Clark advocates using Aegis Ashore in places such as Japan, reducing the reliance on sea-based ballistic-missile defense (BMD) in cruisers and destroyers, while keeping the capability for contingencies. He said such a plan would be cheaper than sea-based BMD, with each Aegis Ashore system taking the place of two BMD ships.