America's Army has developed a bit of a split personality of late. On the one hand, the top brass has very publicly embraced the administration's January 2012 strategic guidance that emphasizes "innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches" and "building partner capacity" in lieu of large ground force deployments. Leaders from Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno on down talk up the Army's capabilities in cyberspace, missile defense, seaborne operations, and small advisor teams.
At the same time, the service's biggest new weapons program remains the controversial Ground Combat Vehicle, an estimated $34 billion program to build what could be 70-ton-plus behemoths optimized for all-out land war. "Low-cost" and "small-footprint" it ain't. ("Innovative" it may be; read on). And GCV is just the tip of the armored iceberg.
Outside the Washington spotlight, the Army is quietly trying to heavy up. There are plans to upgrade Humvee-mounted scout troops to tank-like Bradleys, add back light armored vehicles to the 82nd Airborne, and buy a new, better-protected Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace the aging, vulnerable M113s in support units. (A formal request for proposals on AMPV will come out soon). In less tangible ways as well, from brigade organization to training scenarios, the Army is working to reemphasize straight-ahead ground fighting power/.../
No less an expert than Andrew Krepinevich, advisor to the Pentagon and head of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has argued that the Army should hold off on buying armored vehicles until there is some kind of breakthrough in protective technology. Without such a revolution, Krepinevich argues, the enemy can always build bigger IEDs or rockets more easily than the Army can add more armor.