There is no question that America needs to invest in keeping its nuclear deterrent credible, said Paul Huessy, an expert on nuclear weapons at GeoStrategic Analysis. In his view, however, the missile industrial base is less of a concern than retaining the ability to develop an actual nuclear warhead, he said. Huessy and Barry Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments say that programs like the EELV or refurbishment programs for existing missiles are probably sufficient to keep ICBM and SLBM design skills alive. Huessy said that there are many components on the U.S. Air Force Minuteman III, for example, that are being replaced—which requires many of the skills needed to design an entirely new weapon. “They have all sorts of ideas on how to build a Minuteman [replacement],” he said.
But while the United States continues to upgrade existing missiles, other nations continue to develop and field nuclear weapons and the launch vehicles to deliver them. Russia continues to modernize its arsenal with new Topol-M ICBMs, new Bulava SLBMs, and reportedly another new heavy ICBM that is under development. So too, is China modernizing its nuclear forces, Huessy said. “[Assistant Defense Secretary Madelyn Creeden, in her April 17 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee] also concluded China is building advanced solid fueled rockets, a new type 094 Jin-class submarine along with its new JL-2 missile,” he said.
But the real problem might be far more serious than whether the United States will be able to build a new ballistic missile. There are doubts as to whether the nation will be able to retain the talent to build a new nuclear weapon in the future. “We’re as a matter of policy leaning in the direction of exiting the nuclear business,” Watts said.
Watts said that he simply does not know if the United States still has the capability to develop a new weapon. Huessy said that while lots of lab testing has been done, the country has not built a nuclear weapon since about 1991. “We’re also losing that talent,” he said. “The number of people who have built nuclear weapons could fit in a phone booth.”
The leftover warheads from end of the Cold War were approaching limits of what could be achieved for yield, Watts said, and were only designed for a lifespan of about 10 years. Now the weapons are approaching an average age of about quarter of century.
Though the U.S. nuclear stockpile most likely works, at the end the day, without a full-scale test, it is not known if the weapons would actually detonate properly, Huessy said. Essentially, without testing, the United States is hoping computer models are robust enough to make sure the devices work. The labs look for deteriorated parts and replace those. Ultimately though, “We’re guessing that they work,” Huessy said.
The United States could resolves some of those issues by bringing forward low-level design programs for ballistic missiles, Goure said. For a ballistic-missile program, the military would have to consider whether the Minuteman and Trident could be replaced with a common weapon, he said. However, given the size restrictions on board a submarine, a naval weapon would have to be adapted for land-based use—otherwise, it simply would not work. ICBMs are much larger than the typical SLBM and would not fit into the 87-inch tubes of either the Ohio or SSBN(X) classes of submarines, Goure said.
As for maintaining the nuclear-weapons complex, U.S. policy would have to fundamentally change. Watts said that if the assumption is that nuclear weapons are “going away,” then investing in new designs is a waste. President Barack Obama’s administration adheres to a vision of a “global zero” for nuclear weapons, but has pledged to maintain a credible deterrent. However, as the nation’s ability to design and build such weapons atrophies, so does that deterrent—and as Watts points out, the number nuclear-weapon states is increasing rather than decreasing.