President Donald Trump enters office facing a variety of foreign policy challenges. One of his largest and most consequential will be dealing with a resurgent and increasingly unpredictable Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, each new American presidential administration has sought to improve relations with Moscow – the last attempt being President Barack Obama’s “reset.” Trump, however, seems a bit too keen to follow this pattern, straying beyond diplomatic pleasantries to praise Vladimir Putin directly and vowing to “make some good deals” with him. In doing so, Trump runs the risk of both forgoing vital consultations with stalwart allies and partners in Europe and failing to grasp the danger that Russia poses to European and international security.
Certainly improved relations between the United States and Russia, as well as between Brussels and Moscow, would be positive and mutually beneficial; we have seen, for instance, how these actors can cooperate effectively on international issues such as promoting stability in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not the broader “ends” of Trump’s policies – improved relations with Moscow – that are worrying. Rather, it is the “means” by which he and a number of European leaders are pursuing this relationship that should raise concerns. More simply put, it is the wrong détente.
The Wrong Détente
For both sides of the Atlantic, 2017 will mark an important year for relations with Russia. In the United States, in particular, there are clear indications that a radical shift in policy toward Moscow is underway. On the campaign trail and even after winning the election, Trump has lampooned the U.S. intelligence community for manufacturing “fake news,” moved quickly to side with Putin over Obama on a range of issues, and suggested that he will consider recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and lifting the corresponding sanctions. For the latter, Trump recently clarified his position, noting that he would contemplate dismantling the sanctions regime as a quid pro quo for Russian cooperation on other issues such as counterterrorism operations against ISIL. Rex Tillerson, U.S. Secretary of State and former ExxonMobil CEO, has also expressed hesitation over the virtue of sanctions. Despite recently walking back some of those controversial opinions, Tillerson’s worldview is nonetheless likely to be shaped by his business experiences and previous dealings with Moscow.
There is a similar attitude spreading across Europe. Many politicians, particularly on the far right, are calling for a lifting of sanctions against Russia. Perhaps most notably, Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Front, has long defended the legitimacy of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and described the sanctions as “senseless” and a “pretty stupid method of diplomacy.” Yet these views are creeping into the mainstream as well. Francois Fillon, the Republican presidential nominee, and Le Pen’s primary competitor for the French election this year has consistently opposed the sanctions regime. His position stands in stark contrast to that of France’s current president, Francois Hollande, who has ardently pushed for tougher measures against Russia. Should either Le Pen or Fillon emerge on top and join Trump in rolling back sanctions, it would reverse the hard-fought policies of one of the EU’s most influential powers. Even if this criticism proves to be mere rhetoric, it may spook other states into dismantling the sanctions regime for fear of being left in the cold.
National Security Consequences of Premature Sanctions Removal
In particular, removing sanctions at this point would have three detrimental consequences. First, it would reward Russia for not following through on its commitments to a sustainable cease-fire in eastern Ukraine. American and European officials have made it clear why they imposed sanctions on Russia: its annexation of Crimea and incursion into eastern Ukraine. They have also outlined what would result in the removal of sanctions: the implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Lifting sanctions without clear evidence of full compliance with the agreement’s parameters would allow Moscow to achieve its goals in the region with no additional costs.
Second, it could embolden Russia to use its experience in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as an example for future territorial incursions – not to mention inspire other states with their own territorial claims. With no further consequences for its actions, Moscow could prey upon another former Soviet state – perhaps in the Baltics – and repeat its revisionist plan. Surely there are noteworthy differences between these countries and Ukraine that could prevent Russia from pursuing a duplicate course of action, but its broader contours nonetheless serve as a template. Moscow’s large-scale snap exercises, nuclear saber rattling, and air and maritime incursions certainly do not quell concerns in the region over the potential for renewed Russian aggression.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, removing sanctions would prematurely undermine transatlantic unity. The sanctions regime against Russia marks an important achievement regarding policy coordination between Washington and Brussels, signaling discontent with Moscow’s behavior and upholding a commitment to international norms and law. Lifting sanctions hastily would undermine this pledge, sending very clear signals to Russia that it can do as it pleases and mixed messages to allies in Europe that sovereignty is of little concern.
The Right Détente
If this is the wrong détente, then what is the right approach? Attempting renewed relations with Russia, the Trump administration should consider three guiding principles. First, Trump’s reset must come from a position of strength. The new administration cannot simply hope that hollow goodwill or a diplomatic gesture will negate years of mutual distrust. As a businessman, Trump should recognize that he needs his own leverage to earn Putin’s respect, convince him to rethink some of Moscow’s most egregious pursuits, and demonstrate that the United States is not divided on foreign policy. A good first step would be to prioritize and augment the Obama administration’s European Reassurance Initiative.
Second, a reset must be coordinated with American allies and partners in Europe. Despite criticizing the European Union and NATO, Trump must now put aside his campaign rhetoric and move on. It is essential that he maintain transatlantic unity and avoids pursuing a unilateral rapprochement that leaves Europe in an awkward position. To work through the established NATO channels, for example, Trump would do well to call for a summit level North Atlantic Council meeting on future relations with Russia in order to consult all twenty-eight heads of government. Following that gathering, Trump could propose a convening of the NATO-Russia Council to engage Moscow on decisions taken by NATO members. In particular, Trump should not meet face-to-face with Putin before coordinating Russia policy with European leaders at the upcoming NATO summit.
Finally, a new relationship with Russia should not only focus on military and political elements, but also on cultural initiatives. In particular, it should encourage opportunities for educational and professional exchanges between Americans and Russians. As an initial deliverable, Trump and Putin could announce a joint government exchange that brings together American and Russian professionals. Such an initiative could help, say, defense or foreign policy practitioners get to know their counterparts on both a personal and professional level and exchange perspectives on a variety of topics. Even if the subjects are pre-approved and do not allow for controversial discussion, bringing these groups to the table will nonetheless be an important step forward to repair relations.
Conclusion
What started as an initial round of sanctions imposed through executive orders has become an important vehicle of economic statecraft and formed the core of the transatlantic policy response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the incursion of Russian troops into eastern Ukraine. The sanctions regime has fostered consensus between the United States and Europe, signaled disapproval with Russia’s actions, and deterred large-scale follow-on aggression in Ukraine. It has also reassured allies and partners, particularly in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, of Washington’s commitment to international norms. Lifting sanctions prematurely against Russia, therefore, would negate the crucial work that has helped to maintain European security. Yes, the United States and Europe should try to improve relations with Russia. There is no doubt that it would be useful to open additional diplomatic channels and cooperate in areas of mutual interest. But no, they cannot pursue a partnership in the manner that Trump and some European politicians suggest. It simply is the wrong détente.