Asked flat out whether transformation was back as a central organizing principle for the Pentagon, Krepinevich -- who literally wrote the paper on transformation, "The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment" in 1992 -- said no. Pressed further, he says: "I would probably prefer to give a not-sure answer." He argues with his usual precision that transformation per se -- roughly defined as the Pentagon's efforts to actually implement a Revolution in Military Affairs -- may not have ever really happened, so it's hard to say it's back/.../
However, if you trace the concepts from Krepinevich's original transformation paper's focus on precision weapons and deep strike to the current focus on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and its child, AirSea Battle, then there really is a pretty unbroken line.
Andy argues that if China is our main concern -- and he thinks it is -- and our pivot to the Pacific is real, we must craft a force structure capable of acting effectively against a competitor who has targeted our very strengths -- precision weapons and networks. If you want to compare this problem with the one we faced with the Soviet Union -- how do you deter a prime competitor -- he says we need to delineate our goals first.
"Do you accommodate a shift in the military balance in an area we have said is vital to our national security since World War II? If you don't, that has huge implications, to Japan building nuclear weapons and to other countries in the world wondering about our intentions," he argues. "If I were Adm. Locklear, I'd want some answers. Am I supposed to do it by defending the first island chain? If not, am I supposed to blockade them? What am I supposed to do?"