Boot-centric warfare (BCW) is a resilient idea. It holds that the war is not truly engaged in, let alone won, until a rifleman's boots are on the ground.
But BCW doctrine does not withstand historical analysis. While believers remind you that World War II was not won from the air, they forget how close it came to being lost in the North Atlantic. And the Cold War was decided without a single steel-capped toe crossing the East-West divide in anger.
But BCW advocates don't work that way. BCW is manly . . . the way of the warrior . . . and only those who have experienced infantry combat can understand it or are permitted to opine on it. But if the debate goes like that, it will continue to get advanced nations into all kinds of trouble. Consider this: What was Al Qaeda's 2011 budget for rehabilitating suicide bombers?
In June at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), think-tank President Andrew Krepinevich talked about “cost imposition,” as in forcing your adversary into countermoves that cost many times what your own capabilities cost you. One example is the U.S. decision to keep a strategic bomber force, after the ballistic missile revolution of the 1960s, which forced the Soviet Union to retain its air defenses. Better examples are the costs imposed on the U.S. by the Viet Cong, Taliban and Iraqi insurgents.
But while pouring boots in country was once a necessity, technology continues to change what it means to “hold ground.” At the Eurosatory show last month, Elbit talked about “terrain dominance,” in which “holding ground” is redefined to mean “knowing more about what is moving in the area than the enemy does.” The key is fusing information from diverse sources, including signals intelligence, unattended seismic ground sensors and man-portable radars, with UAVs providing wide-area surveillance and targeting as needed.
We also report in this issue (see p. DT21) on the changing role of artillery in the Israel Defense Forces—moving from saturation or statistical fire toward increasing precision. In Elbit's concept, scaled to control a 20 X 20-km area, the key non-line-of-sight weapon is the humble mortar, with a guided round.
This is not BCW or even network-centric warfare—rather, it is knowledge-centric warfare. It can mean fewer friendly targets within enemy range, and—another key observation from Eurosatory 2012—those targets are better protected than ever, with everything from high-tech armor (using materials like polyurethane fibers, transparent ceramics and computer-designed steel alloys) to combat-proven ways to destroy incoming rockets. Hardly any of this stuff was dreamed of a decade ago, it is expensive, and it has to be refreshed to keep ahead of the enemy.
Yet this concept is not popular in some defense circles, particularly in the U.S., where any percentage cut in soldiers or Marines is a lot of people —as well as shrunken or closed bases and growing ranks of people who will be denied stars on their shoulders or a chance to earn lifetime retirement benefits for just 20 years in uniform.
Even the toughest analysts in Washington don't like to talk about boot numbers getting close to 500,000 pairs, much less lower. But technology makes it possible and the changing face of conflict and economic reality make it necessary.