News

CSBA Study Says Modernizing Nuclear Triad Is Affordable

August 6, 2015 SEAPOWER

A Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) study released Aug. 4 disputes the widely circulated theory that modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, including replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and their sea-launched intercontinental missiles, is “unaffordable.”

Report: Upgrading U.S. Nuclear Forces Could be Affordable Under Sequestration

August 6, 2015 USNI News

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments acknowledges in a new report that modernizing U.S. nuclear forces — with programs such as the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine — will compete for funds conventional weapons upgrades like the F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Nuclear upgrade costs $700 billion over next 25 years, think-tank study estimates

August 6, 2015 Air Force Times

The U.S. will face a “bow wave” of increased costs to update its nuclear arsenal, but operating budgets could thereafter return to levels comparable to today's, according to a new study released by a Washington, D.C. think tank.

Slashing Nukes Won’t Save Much $$: CSBA

August 5, 2015 Breaking Defense

Nuclear weapons are expensive. So are the bombers, missiles, andsubmarines used to deliver them. But in the context of total defense spending, budget guruTodd Harrison argues, they’re a relatively affordable — and strategically critical — part of our armed forces.

New estimates put cost of US nuclear weapons upgrade at $963 billion

August 5, 2015 Al Jazeera America

President Barack Obama’s plans to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next 30 years could cost taxpayers nearly $1 trillion, according to a new study that suggests the project’s long-term price tag will far outpace available Pentagon estimates.

Studies

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

January 13, 2025 Toshi Yoshihara, Jack Bianchi, Casey Nicastro

China’s ambitions, assertiveness, and massive military expansion have stimulated a major shift in Australia’s defense policy. From the AUKUS partnership to new allied posture arrangements to the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities, Australia is carrying out a series of ambitious initiatives to strengthen deterrence. Canberra has further called on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to become a “focused force” designed to deal with the highest-order dangers. As Australia undergoes this strategic reorientation, it confronts weighty investment and divestment decisions that could have lasting consequences for force structure and posture.

Studies

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

December 9, 2024 Travis Sharp

With a new administration and new Congress entering office, experts from across the political spectrum have introduced competing proposals for future U.S. defense budgets. The most noteworthy aspect of these proposals is the extraordinary degree to which they differ. One issue driving the differences is NATO military spending. Much attention has centered on NATO members devoting at least 2 percent of their GDP to defense. Despite this attention, research has rarely projected the additional funding and forces that could be generated if all NATO countries met the 2 percent of GDP benchmark—or a higher target.

Briefs

Understanding NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area

May 20, 2024 Katherine E. Dahlstrand, Sean Monaghan, Sara Bjerg Moller

NATO, the largest and most powerful military alliance in history, turned seventy-five in April. In July, the leaders of NATO will return to the city where its founding document, the Washington Treaty, was signed in 1949. Most people have heard of NATO. Fewer know its most important document is the Strategic Concept, which is updated every decade or so, and sets the Alliance’s strategy. An even smaller group know about NATO’s “Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area.”

Studies

More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military And Its Ability to Change

March 18, 2024 Katherine E. Dahlstrand

Assessing the type of threat that Russia is likely to pose in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine is a critical challenge for the United States and its allies. What will the Russian military look like in the future? Some argue that the Russian military will remain a significant threat – and perhaps become a very different and even more serious one. This argument holds that the Russian military will reconstitute in a relatively short time frame and may reform according to lessons learned during the war in Ukraine. Others argue that the Russian military will pose a far less formidable conventional threat going forward. Not only has the war against Ukraine exposed fundamental weaknesses in the Russian military, the argument goes, but Moscow’s ability to address those weaknesses will be limited by available manpower, sanctions, and export controls.

Briefs

2023 Annual Report

January 30, 2024

For nearly three decades, CSBA has provided consistent, high-quality, and innovative research on defense strategy, budgets, and the security environment.

Briefs

An Ongoing and Necessary Renaissance: NATO’s Nuclear Posture

January 25, 2024 Eric Edelman, Franklin C. Miller

President Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling while the war in Ukraine has raged, along with lurid nuclear threats by Russian officials and propagandists, have once again focused attention on NATO’s nuclear mission. As the alliance approaches a summit in Washington later this summer, it is an appropriate time to review its nuclear posture.

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military And Its Ability to Change

Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

Inconsistent Congress: Analysis of the 2024 Defense Budget Request

Evaluate Like We Operate: Why DOD Should Evaluate Weapons Systems as Networked Force Packages, Not Individual Platforms

Extending Deterrence by Detection: The Case for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems Into the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness

Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conflict

The Decisive Decade: United States–China Competition in Defense Innovation and Defense Industrial Policy in and Beyond the 2020s

Speeding Toward Instability? Hypersonic Weapons and the Risks of Nuclear Use

Featured Event

Report Release Webinar: Strengthening the Phalanx: Layered, Comprehensive, and Distributed Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific

5 weapons that don’t need a human to pull the trigger

CSBA Study Says Modernizing Nuclear Triad Is Affordable

Report: Upgrading U.S. Nuclear Forces Could be Affordable Under Sequestration

Nuclear upgrade costs $700 billion over next 25 years, think-tank study estimates

Slashing Nukes Won’t Save Much $$: CSBA

New estimates put cost of US nuclear weapons upgrade at $963 billion

Latest Publications

Focused Force: China’s Military Challenge and Australia’s Response

Putting It All Together: The 2025 Defense Budget Request, Alternative Budget Proposals, and NATO Spending

Understanding NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area

More of the Same? The Future of the Russian Military And Its Ability to Change

2023 Annual Report

An Ongoing and Necessary Renaissance: NATO’s Nuclear Posture