How to do it without putting a single coalition plane directly over Libyan territory.
The U.S. and its allies successfully implemented no-fly zones against Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, so why not against Moammar Gadhafi's remaining security forces in Libya today? U.S. military and defense officials have offered various arguments against a Libyan no-fly zone—but their reasoning doesn't necessarily apply to this case.
In warning against a no-fly zone, officials like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have made three critical assumptions. First, that it will necessitate putting combat aircraft over Libyan territory. Second, that protecting those aircraft would require extensive attacks to suppress Libyan air defenses, potentially escalating the conflict. And third, that maintaining a no-fly zone would require a substantial number of aircraft for an indefinite period of time.
These assumptions are entirely consistent with the lessons learned from the no-fly zones over the Balkans and Iraq, but in Libya an alternative approach may be possible. Call it a "stand-off" no-fly zone.
Unlike in the Balkans and Iraq, Libya's most populated cities and airbases are situated near its coastline, with most located less than 10 miles from the shore. In addition, due to the fracturing of the Libyan military, Gadhafi's forces have limited capability to retaliate. Thus it may be possible to enforce a no-fly zone without putting a single coalition plane directly over Libyan territory.
This approach would use precision-guided weapons to keep U.S. and allied planes out of range of Libya's air force and air defenses.
Rather than putting combat air patrols over Libya, it would employ ships and aircraft operating off the coast. Libyan aircraft violating the no-fly zone could be intercepted using ships armed with SM-2 surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft armed with AIM-120 air-to-air missiles, which can hit targets beyond visual range.
While these systems are most effective against high-flying aircraft, they would also make it more difficult for Libyan jets to bomb opposition positions or conduct low-level strafing runs against civilian populations in the north. And these systems would be particularly effective if Libyan rebel forces simultaneously employ shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, which are best against low-flying targets.
This approach would obviate the need to suppress Libyan air defenses before imposing a no-fly zone, since coalition aircraft would operate beyond their effective range. In addition, rather than employing aircraft from carriers, it would use a much smaller number of land-based combat aircraft that can be refueled in the air.
This concept would underscore the critical distinction between air control and air denial. Extended-range precision-guided weapons can deny an opponent the use of airspace (especially a weaker opponent) without requiring actual control of the airspace. Maintaining a stand-off no-fly zone wouldn't require total control over Libya's airspace—only the ability to deny Gadhafi the effective use of that airspace.
While a host of political and strategic considerations could lead U.S. and NATO leaders not to impose a no-fly zone, there is no insurmountable operational hurdle. The U.S. and its allies will likely face future dilemmas about whether to intervene in a country to prevent mass atrocities. In the near term, continued advances in extended-range precision-guided weaponry will offer various options for projecting power.
In the longer-term, as guided weapons proliferate more widely, other countries may use them to constrain U.S. power-projection and deny it regional access. But for the time being at least, the U.S. continues to have the advantage, should U.S. leaders choose to exploit it.