Over the past 15 years or so, the People’s Liberation Army has undertaken a significant military modernization program. A large portion of this modernization has centered around a counter-intervention strategy—that is, developing capabilities and forces that have the wherewithal to prevent or to make it very costly or difficult for an outside power to intervene in the Western Pacific area, and at the same time make it very difficult for such a power to operate at all in that same area over time.
This is less of a threat than it is a military challenge that has to be addressed. And I would say that, while much of the focus when it comes to anti-access and area-denial rests with China, this is not simply about China. It is a broader military phenomenon that is occurring on a global scale.
Power projection for the United States over the last several decades has been relatively easy. We’ve been able to transit the oceans unimpeded. We have been able to operate aircraft from bases close to potential opponents and to steam our aircraft carriers and other large surface combat vessels right up to the coastlines of other countries. This pattern of military activity may be more difficult in the future, as we’re already seeing today with the debate over Syria and the military challenges that are posed by its anti-ship cruise missiles as well as its advanced air defense systems, and we may see it in other parts of the world as well.
These same capabilities could be just as easily used by our friends and allies around the world to better defend their sovereignty. That is, countries like Japan could create their own anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) perimeters or envelopes to better defend their sovereignty and their inherent right to self-defense.
To address the shifting military balance in the western Pacific, there are a handful of steps Tokyo and Washington should consider.