Publications

The central argument of this report is that, in light of the complex and intensifying security challenges the United States now faces, the nation can no longer afford poor strategic performance. The time to reverse the decline in US strategic competence is long overdue. The first task is for American political and military leaders to develop a clearer understanding of what strategy actually is, and what cognitive skills are necessary to craft and implement good strategies.

This backgrounder offers some preliminary observations on the likely characteristics of the new program, and raises several questions that the Army will have to address as it goes forward.

Classified or “black” programs appear to account for about $35.8 billion, or 17 percent, of the acquisition funding included in the fiscal year (FY) 2010 Department of Defense (DoD) budget request (see Table, page 3). This total includes $18.1 billion in procurement funding and $17.7 billion in research and development (R&D) funding. These figures represent 14 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the total funding requested for procurement and R&D in FY 2010. Among other things, this analysis finds that:

The Obama Administration has requested a total of $668 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD) in the FY 2010 budget. The “base” budget for the Department includes $534 billion in discretionary funding and an additional $4 billion in mandatory funding. The budget also includes, for the first time, full-year funding for the wars in Iraq and  Afghanistan—now termed Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The cost of the wars is estimated at $130 billion for FY 2010. In real terms, the base DoD budget is an $18 billion increase over last year’s budget, while the funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is a $17 billion decrease from FY 2009.

This report assesses the effect that the operations in these two theaters have had on the plans, programs, and budgets of the US military, specifically those of the US Army. It makes projections for the future costs of the operations in these two theaters.

It now appears likely that F-22 production will end with a procurement of 187 Raptors, of which 179 will be operational aircraft. The crucial moment came on July 21st, 2009, when the full Senate voted fifty-eight to forty to strip the $1.75 billion Senate defense authorizers had added to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 defense bill to keep F-22 in production. This vote came in the wake of intense lobbying by defense secretary Robert Gates and a veto threat from the White House should Congress continue F-22 production beyond FY 2009. In light of these developments, now seems as good a time as any to look back and try to take stock of the F-22 program. Are there any lessons to be learned, and where, if anywhere, is the program likely to go from here?