Publications

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sparked grave concern that the United States might be struck by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Typically, policymakers and analysts include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons in this category. Of these WMD, biological agents may pose the greatest danger. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons can, under the right circumstances, cause massive casualties. Compared to nuclear weapons, however, biological weapons may be substantially easier to acquire.

If national strategy defines US intent in its approach toward global affairs and provides focus for American foreign policy, then the US global defense (military) posture reflects the US capability to project military power beyond its borders and across transoceanic ranges in support of US national security policy objectives.  The United States thus adopts and maintains a global military posture as an  indispensable means of securing its national interests.

When hearing the term “ships-of-the-line”—warships that take their place in a navy’s line of battle—most think of old two- or three-deck sailing ships carrying large cannon batteries, or perhaps steam-powered, armored battleships. Since entering the age of jet aircraft, guided missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines, however, the US Navy’s “surface battle line” consists of battle force capable (BFC) surface combatants—large, multi-mission and focused-mission warships designed first to operate as part of a fast Carrier Strike Group. These include guided missile cruisers (CGs), guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and general-purpose destroyers (DDs). Battle force capable combatants are separate and distinct from legacy  protection of shipping combatants (now known as frigates and guided missile frigates) and newer littoral combat ships, both of which are smaller, and less capable, focused-mission warships.

The research and analysis underlying this report began in 2003 and aimed at answering the following question. How has the maturation of non-nuclear guided munitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s affected the conduct of warfare by advanced militaries, especially by the various combat arms of the US armed forces? In this context, guided munitions were understood to be those that could actively home on their targets or aim-points after being fired, released, or launched.

The United States currently possess an arsenal of about 3,950 “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear warheads. These weapons are deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. These weapon systems are capable of striking targets located anywhere on the globe, and causing enormous destruction. The explosive power of the individual warheads carried by these systems ranges from as little as 0.3 kilotons (equivalent to 300 tons of TNT) to as much as 1.2 megatons (equivalent to 1.2 million tons of TNT). Under Bush Administration plans, the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons will be reduced to 1,700-2,200 warheads by the end of 2012.

“Seabasing” is a new defense buzzword of growing importance and prominence in both joint and naval circles. Unfortunately, despite the increasingly common use of the term by both joint and naval planners alike, there still remains much mystery and misunderstanding about this important “new” concept. Indeed, one of the key problems that has hindered meaningful debate and discussion about seabasing—and especially the priorities revealed in its associated plans and programs—is that its contemporary definition and the important ideas that support it are poorly understood except among the relatively small group of officers and  planners who have been intimately involved with their development.