Publications

This report addresses the issue of the United States pursuing a preventive war (or what the Bush Administration has labeled “preemptive” war) against Iraq. Preventive wars and attacks are relatively rare in history, and for good reason. Any war is a risky proposition. Choosing to assume that risk by initiating conflict is something that states have done typically with great reluctance. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for launching a preventive war against Iraq.

This net assessment of the military-technical revolution, issued in July of 1992, is perhaps the best-known assessment prepared by the Office of Net Assessment. It has, I believe, held up well over time. The strategic management issues it raised should still be of special interest to top-level Department of Defense officials.

The Department of Defense (DoD) in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that the “anti-access” threat—the complex mix of political, geographic, and military factors that could prevent or delay US forces from deploying to a combat theater—is the dominant strategic challenge confronting future US power-projection operations in regions of potential conflict, particularly in Asia.

In early 2002, the Department of Defense (DoD) unveiled the results of its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR was conducted to meet a congressional requirement for a “comprehensive review” of the policy, strategy, plans, stockpile, and infrastructure for US nuclear forces. It was the second such review. A similar undertaking was completed in 1994.

The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the Defense Department’s efforts in counterterrorism and homeland security. The report is due to be released this month. A particular area of Congressional interest is the future use of the Reserve Component.1 Stretching back to their roots as colonial militias, America’s citizen-soldiers have historically played a key part in protecting the homeland. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many expect the role of the Reserves to be greatly expanded. Several major studies have already called for homeland security to become the Reserve Component’s primary mission.2 Will the Department of Defense heed their call? The department is not approaching the issue with a blank sheet of paper. The 1999 Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), the Defense Department’s most detailed, wide-ranging analysis of the Reserves’ potential contributions to homeland security, reveals what has been done so far and why the prospects for further change are not bright.

The once mighty U.S. Navy is in precipitous decline. At least, that is what a vocal group of naval officers, defense analysts and Congressional leaders strongly believe. They support their judgment by comparing the number of ships in the Navy’s “Total Ship Battle Force” with those of past U.S. fleets. Their most common standard for comparison is the “600-ship” fleet championed by John Lehman, President Ronald Reagan’s first, most aggressive and politically savvy, Secretary of the Navy. When compared to that number, the 316 ships of the Fiscal Year