Publications

During the 1920s and 1930s, even as it was engaged in a series of “small wars,” the Marine Corps dedicated itself to solving the “Gallipoli problem”: how to conduct amphibious assaults against a heavily defended shore. To do so, the Corps had to develop new concepts of operation, tactics and techniques, equipment, and organizations that enabled it to apply combat power against the enemy more effectively. The most daunting tactical challenge for the Corps was gaining a foothold on an enemy shore and steadily building combat power while under constant attack. The Navy and Marines thus developed an operational concept that included extensive shore bombardment from Navy ships and naval aircraft, amphibious landing craft by which the Marines could get to the beach, and various techniques for methodically breaking through and reducing enemy defensive positions. The fruits of the Corps’ labor were seen in the many amphibious successes of the United States military in World War II, in both the Pacific and European theaters.

Ever since Thucydides recorded the dramatic fall of Athens’ vaunted navy at Syracuse in 413 BC, naval warfare has been marked by abrupt competitive shifts. Intense geopolitical and maritime rivalries between well-financed seafaring nations, the emergence of new operational challenges for established naval powers, and the novel incorporation of advanced technologies in naval weapons and ship designs have all repeatedly spurred transformations that have redefined naval warfare.

Simple solutions to complex problems are inherently attractive and almost always wrong. So it is with the Pentagon’s recent decision to enter into “crash” production of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles, or MRAPs. Political and military leaders are currently grappling with this problem, which can be summed up as: How much to invest in a new system that appears to provide enhanced protection for troops against the most common, lethal threat in Iraq, without undermining either the ability of the force to conduct the current mission set before it, or the ability to remain effective across the range of missions and operating environments it will also have to be ready for in the years ahead?

Aircraft carriers are one of America’s key power-projection systems. To ensure their continued operational effectiveness and survivability in the future security environment, they need to be equipped with new air platforms with greater range (independent reach), greater persistence (ability to loiter over the target area), and improved stealth (ability to survive in contested airspace).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sparked grave concern that the United States might be struck by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Typically, policymakers and analysts include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons in this category. Of these WMD, biological agents may pose the greatest danger. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons can, under the right circumstances, cause massive casualties. Compared to nuclear weapons, however, biological weapons may be substantially easier to acquire.

When hearing the term “ships-of-the-line”—warships that take their place in a navy’s line of battle—most think of old two- or three-deck sailing ships carrying large cannon batteries, or perhaps steam-powered, armored battleships. Since entering the age of jet aircraft, guided missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines, however, the US Navy’s “surface battle line” consists of battle force capable (BFC) surface combatants—large, multi-mission and focused-mission warships designed first to operate as part of a fast Carrier Strike Group. These include guided missile cruisers (CGs), guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and general-purpose destroyers (DDs). Battle force capable combatants are separate and distinct from legacy  protection of shipping combatants (now known as frigates and guided missile frigates) and newer littoral combat ships, both of which are smaller, and less capable, focused-mission warships.