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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on this important issue. My testimony is intended to provide a context within which one might assess Joint Forces Command’s (JFCOM’s) mission for joint concept development and experimentation in the wake of the command’s disestablishment.

The ability to conduct long-range strike operations has long provided the United States with a decisive military advantage over its enemies. Today, that advantage is dissipating

In 2008, the US Navy commissioned USS Freedom (LCS-1), the first of a new type of ship, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), produced by Lockheed Martin. It anticipated commissioning a second, distinctly different LCS variant, to be named Independence (LCS-2), produced by General Dynamics, late in 2009. Despite initial issues with design, operational requirements, and especially cost growth, the Navy plans to order substantial numbers of one variant to help address the problem of declining surface ship force levels.

Senior defense officials face a host of critical issues when assessing the nation’s military posture. Most importantly, they are responsible for determining which threats the United States must be prepared to address, what capabilities will be required to do so, and how the US military should be organized, trained, equipped, and employed to counter these threats successfully if and when they materialize.

It now appears likely that F-22 production will end with a procurement of 187 Raptors, of which 179 will be operational aircraft. The crucial moment came on July 21st, 2009, when the full Senate voted fifty-eight to forty to strip the $1.75 billion Senate defense authorizers had added to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 defense bill to keep F-22 in production. This vote came in the wake of intense lobbying by defense secretary Robert Gates and a veto threat from the White House should Congress continue F-22 production beyond FY 2009. In light of these developments, now seems as good a time as any to look back and try to take stock of the F-22 program. Are there any lessons to be learned, and where, if anywhere, is the program likely to go from here?

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, and distinguished members of the Committee, it is my personal honor to appear before you today to discuss the MV-22 Osprey.