Publications

This testimony delivered before the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Strategic Forces provides an overview of Israeli and Iranian capabilities and doctrines. It assesses prospective characteristics of a nuclear competition between these two countries, as well as those of a prospective “n-player” competition, should Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons lead other states in the region to follow suit. The testimony concludes with some thoughts on what this means for the United States, to include the strategic choices we confront.

On January 27, 2015, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Distinguished Fellow at CSBA, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the implications of the Obama Administration’s approach to the Iran nuclear negotiations.

Despite the recent ostensible improvements in relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, the deteriorating cross-strait military balance continues to worry leaders in Taipei.  Taiwan is long past the point where it can simply buy its way out of what has become a structural security deficit.  It urgently needs a radical rethink of its defense posture vis-a-vis China.

"The U.S. military needs a new offset strategy for projecting power effectively and affordably across the threat spectrum. While it must take account of America’s fiscal circumstances, the central purpose of such strategy must be to address the most pressing military challenge that we face: maintaining our ability to project power globally to deter potential adversaries and reassure allies and friends despite the emergence of A2/AD threats.

Within the next year, the Navy must take advantage of an uncommon opportunity to set the course for the future surface fleet or fall further behind competitors who will increasingly be able to deny U.S. forces access to their region.

This report provides a preliminary outline for an offset strategy that exploits and builds upon existing enduring U.S. capability advantages to restore and maintain U.S. global power projection capability. This effort is essential in order to improve crisis stability, bolster allied confidence in U.S. security commitments, strengthen conventional deterrence, reduce operational risk in the event of war, and compete more efficiently over the long run.