News
A Tale of Two Budgets
It was the best of budgets, it was the worst of budgets,
US Army Must Redefine Its Role
In the bureaucratic battles being waged over the US defense budget, the Army is in retreat on all fronts. Its primary function — fighting and winning wars on land — is out of step with a national military strategy that prioritizes the Asia-Pacific, where air and maritime power predominate and large-scale, US-led land wars are less likely.
How to Put Military Pressure on Russia
NATO now has reason to station nuclear forces in front-line member states.
Surprises in the FY 2015 Defense Budget
Much of what was briefed in yesterday’s budget rollout was discussed by Secretary Hagel and Pentagon leaders in advance of the release. There were, however, a few surprises in the details briefed by the DoD Comptroller, Bob Hale. Slide 11 of his briefing, shown below, lists Army and Marine Corps end strength and the number of carriers projected in the force.[1] The footnote at the bottom of the slide is key to understanding what is actually funded in the budget request. This footnote and Mr. Hale’s discussion of it during the briefing indicate that the FY 2015 budget does not in fact fund the higher end-strength and carrier levels listed in the column labeled “Goal w/o Sequester FY 2019.”
Fixing the Budget Problem Starts with Accepting the Politics Behind It
The federal budget process takes quite a beating. The government hasn't passed all its appropriations on time in 16 years, relying instead on continuing resolutions to keep the government open (or not, as we saw last year). Until last December's Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA), Congress went three years without deciding how much to spend before giving agencies their funding. And with the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), we created a budget process Frankenstein that cobbled together inactive features of several previous budget laws and brought them back to life.
Why Taiwan Matters
Should the United States disengage from Taiwan? Why does the island democracy matter? Are America’s security commitments to the small, isolated, Republic of China (ROC) worth both the risk and the cost? China’s impressive economic and military rise, when viewed through the prism of America’s recent economic difficulties and bouts of domestic dysfunction, has engendered amongst certain U.S. elites an exaggerated sense of America’s decline. This declinist persuasion [3], has, in turn, added grist to the arguments of proponents of U.S. military retrenchment or offshore balancing, who believe that America’s commitment to Taiwan serves little to no strategic purpose. Meanwhile, the growing strength of isolationist sentiments amongst an American populace weary of costly overseas engagements has rendered it increasingly challenging for U.S. policymakers to muster popular support for U.S. actions in remote foreign locales. Summarizing these trends, leading academics, such as John Mearsheimer, have predicted [4] that,