Publications

This testimony delivered before the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Strategic Forces provides an overview of Israeli and Iranian capabilities and doctrines. It assesses prospective characteristics of a nuclear competition between these two countries, as well as those of a prospective “n-player” competition, should Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons lead other states in the region to follow suit. The testimony concludes with some thoughts on what this means for the United States, to include the strategic choices we confront.

Regardless of the budget level Congress ultimately sets for defense, choosing where to invest or divest should be informed by the external security challenges we face and the choices we make about strategy. In this regard, likely future operating environments may serve as a useful lens for evaluating programs. In particular, forces and capabilities most viable to project power in contested environments may represent areas for preserving or expanding, while those that have been designed for relatively benign operating environments may be targets for divestiture.

What our exercise helps illuminate—and what my colleagues will speak to in their testimony—are the core capabilities the military must protect, and, in some cases, increase investments in regardless of the budgetary constraints imposed.

On January 27, 2015, Ambassador Eric Edelman, Distinguished Fellow at CSBA, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the implications of the Obama Administration’s approach to the Iran nuclear negotiations.

This report describes how undersea competitions evolved over the last century, the disruptive trends that may lead to a new era in undersea warfare, and the elements that will comprise an effective approach to the next chapter in undersea competition.

Despite the recent ostensible improvements in relations between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, the deteriorating cross-strait military balance continues to worry leaders in Taipei.  Taiwan is long past the point where it can simply buy its way out of what has become a structural security deficit.  It urgently needs a radical rethink of its defense posture vis-a-vis China.