Publications

“Seabasing” is a new defense buzzword of growing importance and prominence in both joint and naval circles. Unfortunately, despite the increasingly common use of the term by both joint and naval planners alike, there still remains much mystery and misunderstanding about this important “new” concept. Indeed, one of the key problems that has hindered meaningful debate and discussion about seabasing—and especially the priorities revealed in its associated plans and programs—is that its contemporary definition and the important ideas that support it are poorly understood except among the relatively small group of officers and  planners who have been intimately involved with their development.

The global naval competition is an enduring “race” between an ever-changing, disparate group of competitors. A few select competitors enter the race to “win”—to become the number one contemporary naval power. Other competitors enter the race for nationally important but more modest goals, such as becoming a respected regional navy. Still others enter the race only to be part of the sea-going “community of commercial interests and righteous ideals,” with no intention of competing against stronger, more capable naval opponents.

This report provides a point-of-departure framework for developing a post-9/11 defense posture. Its purpose is to assist those charged either with crafting the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or evaluating it.

This report has two main thrusts: first, to articulate the prospective role of long-range strike (LRS) in future US military strategy; and, second, to explore American LRS needs in the mid- to long-term.

The growth of foreign ballistic missile arsenals has received considerable attention in recent years. Less noticed has been the spread of increasingly capable cruise  missiles. The 2003 Iraq War showed that while the United States has made strides in protecting its forces against ballistic missiles, it has placed far less effort on addressing the threat posed by cruise missiles. While US and Kuwaiti Patriot theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) batteries intercepted and destroyed all nine Iraqi ballistic missiles launched at military targets, they failed to detect or intercept any of the five HY-2/CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise missiles launched against Kuwait. One came close to hitting Camp Commando, the US Marine Corps headquarters in Kuwait, on the first day of the war. Another landed just outside a shopping mall in Kuwait City. The missiles also contributed to fratricide, causing the loss of two coalition aircraft and the death of three crewmembers.

The effectiveness of the US military depends critically on its ability to attract and retain quality military personnel. As demonstrated by its performance in recent conflicts, the quality of the US military is today very high. Maintaining such a force in the future must be a central goal of US defense planning. Attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of personnel, with the right talents, skills and levels of experience, will require providing competitive compensation packages. This means not only providing adequate levels of compensation, but providing the right mix of pay and other benefits, and providing them through a flexible and adaptive personnel management structure.