Publications

Today the US military finds itself in a period of large-scale change in the conduct of warfare. There is wide verbal acceptance in American military circles that we are in the midst of a military revolution, or “revolution in military affairs” that will require a transformation of the US armed forces. Yet despite the rhetoric, the American military is not conducting the kind of Joint and Service field exercises  characteristic of military organizations engaged in transformation.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has suggested that his department could save $15 billion a year through efficiencies if given the freedom to do so. Numerous studies have also asserted the potential for efficiencies in the Department of Defense (DoD), some arguing that savings could total $30 billion a year or more. Actual savings, however, appear much more modest. Why is it hard for DoD to achieve efficiency savings? How can the department promote efficiencies more effectively?

Critical to the Bush Administration’s ongoing review of national security requirements and strategy is the question of how much the Department of Defense (DoD) should spend on the development and procurement of new weapon systems. More than any other military in recent history, the US military has a tradition of investing in and relying upon advanced weapon systems and other equipment to give it a crucial edge in capabilities. Few doubt that the United States needs to continue relying on, and exploiting, its advantages in weapons technology.

The US military is currently investing billions of dollars annually in developing and deploying a broad range of new precision-guided and electronic-strike weapons. These weapons are revolutionizing the way military organizations are thinking about future conflict. Perhaps nowhere are the potential implications of these weapons more significant than in the case of nuclear forces and strategic-strike operations. For the last forty years, the US strategic deterrent has centered on a triad of intercontinental bombers and land- and sea-based ballistic missile forces.

The principal aim of this report is to assess the evolving capabilities of nations and other actors to exploit near-earth space for military purposes over the next 20-25 years. The broad thrust of the assessment can be encapsulated in the following judgments:

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed a period of military dominance that, with the exception of the brief period at the end of World War II, is unsurpassed in our country’s history. This has given America an opportunity presented to few countries in the course of recorded history: the opportunity to lead the way in creating the conditions for a long peace. But periods of extended military dominance are rare in history, and the current period will likely prove no exception. Nor can the US military’s current advantages be sustained by a business-as-usual approach to defense planning.